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 Redefining Tribal Sovereignty for the Era of Fundamental 
Rights 
MICHAEL DORAN* 
This Article explains a longstanding problem in federal Indian law. For two 
centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the retained, 
inherent sovereignty of American Indian tribes. But more recently, the Court has 
developed the implicit-divestiture theory to deny tribal governments criminal and 
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, even with respect to activities on tribal lands. 
Legal scholars have puzzled over this move from a territorial-based definition of 
tribal sovereignty to a membership-based definition; they have variously explained 
it as the Court’s abandonment of the foundational principles of Indian law, the 
product of the Court’s indifference or even racist hostility to Indians, or a simple 
lack of doctrinal coherence in the Court’s decisions. This Article provides a different 
explanation. The implicit-divestiture cases represent the Court’s effort to address a 
trilemma among three incompatible objectives: preservation of the traditional, 
territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty, preservation of tribal governments’ 
placement outside the federalist structure of the constitutional order, and 
preservation of fundamental rights. The Court has chosen to resolve the trilemma by 
redefining tribal sovereignty to deny tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. Whether 
right or wrong, the implicit-divestiture theory is the Court’s good-faith attempt to 
preserve as much tribal sovereignty as possible without infringing on fundamental 
rights or forcing tribal governments into the federalist structure.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Jones murders Smith. What government has jurisdiction to prosecute Jones? The 
answer usually includes, at a minimum, the government in whose territory the crime 
occurred. If Jones murders Smith in the District of Columbia, the U.S. government 
has criminal jurisdiction; the citizenship and even residence of Jones and Smith are 
irrelevant. Either or both might be citizens or residents of the United States; either or 
both might be citizens or residents of Canada or France or the Republic of South 
Africa. Their physical presence in the District of Columbia at the time of the murder 
is dispositive for the U.S. government’s criminal jurisdiction (setting aside the 
complication that Jones might leave the District of Columbia or even the United 
States after the murder but before the trial). The same is true if Jones murders Smith 
in Massachusetts or California. In that case, Massachusetts or California has 
jurisdiction to prosecute Jones. Again, the citizenship and residence of Jones and 
Smith are beside the point; all that matters is that Jones murdered Smith within the 
borders of Massachusetts or California (and, again, that Jones remains in or can be 
forced to return to Massachusetts or California). Ordinarily, the reasoning behind this 
is as straightforward as the result. Ordinarily, a government has sovereignty over 
everyone and everything within its territory, and ordinarily, that sovereignty includes 
the general power to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction. But there is an entirely 
different set of rules for Indian tribal governments.  
Beginning in 1978 and continuing to the present, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
steadily narrowed tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction over individuals who are not 
tribal members and entities that are not owned or controlled by tribal members.1 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 226–42 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
2020] REDEFINING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY  89 
 
Under current law, an American Indian tribe generally may not assert criminal 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian, and it may assert civil jurisdiction over a nonmember 
only in limited circumstances. Increasingly, these restrictions do not turn on whether 
the underlying activity takes place within Indian country. In other words, the 
trajectory of the Supreme Court’s case law is to define tribal governmental authority 
not in terms of territory but in terms of membership.2 This development troubles 
legal scholars.3 If Indian tribal governments are sovereign—a point made repeatedly 
by the Supreme Court4—why should tribal governments not have full criminal and 
civil jurisdiction over their territories, as is true for other sovereigns? Why should 
tribal sovereignty be defined differently? 
For a very long time the Supreme Court did define tribal sovereignty and tribal 
jurisdiction in terms of territory. In its 1832 decision in Worcester v. Georgia, the 
Supreme Court ruled that state law stops at the border of Indian country5 and that, 
within that border, tribal sovereignty prevails, subject only to whatever authority 
might be given up by treaty with the federal government or taken away by federal 
statute.6 That baseline rule of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty and tribal 
jurisdiction over everyone and everything within Indian country generally endured 
for a century and a half.7 As a member of the Supreme Court put the point during 
                                                                                                                 
 
2012); see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL43324, TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS: 
A LEGAL OVERVIEW (2013). An important note: The Supreme Court’s cases on tribal 
jurisdiction do not always distinguish clearly between adjudicative and prescriptive 
jurisdiction, particularly on the civil side. Where feasible, I distinguish between “civil-
adjudicative jurisdiction” and “civil-regulatory jurisdiction.” But often, I simply elide the two 
with the admittedly ambiguous word “jurisdiction.” 
 2. See infra Section I.A. 
 3. See infra Part II.  
 4. As recently as 2016, the Supreme Court reaffirmed, in dicta, the “pre-existing 
sovereignty” of the Indian tribes. Puerto Rico v. Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016). 
 5. Federal Indian law does not provide a comprehensive definition of “Indian country.” 
For purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, “Indian country” currently is defined as:  
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the 
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the 
reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of 
the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired 
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and 
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been 
extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Thus, Indian country includes all lands within the boundaries of a 
reservation, even lands that are owned in fee simple by non-Indians, and all lands outside the 
boundaries of a reservation that are owned in fee simple by an Indian tribe or by members of 
an Indian tribe. By common practice, the definition in the federal criminal code is used in civil 
matters as well. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 184. In this 
Article, I use the terms “Indian country” and “reservation” interchangeably, and I use the term 
“tribal lands” to refer to land within a reservation (Indian country) that is owned by the tribe, 
by tribal members, or by the United States in trust for the benefit of the tribe or tribal members. 
 6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). 
 7. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, United States v. Lara, 531 U.S. 193 
(2004). 
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oral argument just fifteen years ago: “[I]f you go back a couple hundred years, they 
[the tribes] clearly had their own inherent power to try nonmembers.”8 But in 1978, 
the Supreme Court, with no forewarning, held in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe 
that a tribal government cannot assert criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian, even 
for a crime committed within Indian country.9  
Over the following two decades, the Supreme Court extended the Oliphant 
reasoning to deny tribes criminal, civil-regulatory, and civil-adjudicative jurisdiction 
over nonmember Indians.10 Congress has enacted limited reversals of those decisions 
on the criminal side but otherwise has given the Court a wide berth.11 As recently as 
2016, the Supreme Court came within a single vote of denying tribes all civil-
adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers.12 This change from the traditional, 
territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty to the contemporary, membership-
based definition presents a vexing question for federal Indian law—and, in the view 
of advocates for tribal interests, it amounts to a very serious assault on tribal 
sovereignty.13 The Supreme Court itself has not settled on a single explanation for 
why tribal sovereignty should be so different from nontribal sovereignty.14 The Court 
often treats the point as though it were self-evident; other times, the Court offers 
shifting or contradictory explanations for it.15 
Legal scholars have spent considerable time and effort on the puzzle.16 Several 
analyses argue that the Supreme Court has abandoned the foundational principles of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
 10. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) (civil-adjudicative jurisdiction); 
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990) (criminal jurisdiction); Montana v. United States, 
450 U.S. 544, 565–67 (1981) (civil-regulatory jurisdiction). 
 11. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (amendment to the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
made in 1991, restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians); 25 U.S.C. § 
1304 (2013) (amendment made by the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 
restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for certain domestic-violence and 
dating-violence offenses). 
 12. Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016) (per 
curiam) (upholding tribal civil-adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmember defendant), aff’g by 
an equally divided court sub nom. Dolgencorp v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 
167 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Section I.A.  
 15. See infra Section I.A. 
 16. See, e.g., DEWI IOAN BALL, THE EROSION OF TRIBAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
SILENT REVOLUTION (2016); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT (1997); CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE (2005); ROBERT A. 
WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005); Russell Lawrence Barsh and James 
Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting 
of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979); Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the 
U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and 
Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901; Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction 
over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Bethany R. Berger, 
Liberalism and Republicanism in Federal Indian Law, 38 CONN. L. REV. 813 (2006); Robert 
N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Political Activism: Neo-Colonialism and the Supreme Court’s 
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New Indian Law, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 92 (1991); Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal 
Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002); Richard B. Collins, Implied 
Limitations on the Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1979); Allison M. 
Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: 
The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993); N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit 
Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353 (1994); N. Bruce Duthu, The Thurgood Marshall Papers and the 
Quest for a Principled Theory of Tribal Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of Tribal/State Conflict, 
21 VT. L. REV. 47 (1996); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Civil 
Jurisdiction, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 779 (2014); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and 
Federal Indian Policy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121 (2006); Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: 
Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1499 (2013); Philip P. Frickey, 
A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal 
Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1 (1999); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its 
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754 
(1997); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature 
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, 
Institutional Relationships, and Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through 
the Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2002); Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American 
Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 433 (2005); David H. Getches, 
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 
84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573 (1996); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267 
(2001); L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996); L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty 
After Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669 (2003); Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil 
Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1187 (2010); John P. LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s 
Handbook Cutting-Room Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731 (2006); Jacob T. Levy, Three 
Perversities of Indian Law, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 329 (2008); Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of Its Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391 
(1993); Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal 
Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. REV. 48 (2010); Judith V. Royster, Montana at the Crossroads, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 631 (2006); Thomas P. Schlosser, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers, 
37 TULSA L. REV. 573 (2001); Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme 
Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003); Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 
39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 77 (2014); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation 
that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CALIF. L. REV. 767 
(1993); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indians, Race, and Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 
10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 49 (2017); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense out of Nevada v. 
Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 347 (2001); Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-
Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105; Alex Tallchief 
Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes within “Our Federalism”: Beyond the 
Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667 (2006); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court’s 
Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in 
Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267 (2000); Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism 
in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 
TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003); Catherine T. Struve, How Bad Law Made a Hard Case Easy: 
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federal Indian law, including the concept of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty.17 
On these accounts, towering figures from the past—primarily Chief Justice John 
Marshall, who wrote the seminal opinions on the relationship of Indian tribes to the 
federal and state governments, and Felix Cohen, who first restated federal Indian law 
as a coherent whole in the twentieth century—had developed a compelling legal 
model of tribal sovereignty under which tribal governments are subordinate only to 
the express will of Congress. But, these accounts continue, the contemporary 
Supreme Court’s unwillingness or inability to grasp the necessary implications of 
those foundational principles has led the Court to the membership-based definition 
of tribal sovereignty.  
More pointed analyses argue that the Supreme Court is affirmatively hostile to 
tribes and tribal sovereignty.18 Whether because they generally discount the rights 
and the interests of all racial and ethnic minorities, because they consider Indian 
tribes to be an anomaly within the federalist system, or because the justices are 
unapologetic racists, the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts, these accounts 
maintain, have actively undermined tribal sovereignty through what historian Ned 
Blackhawk calls “common law colonialism.”19 Other analyses conclude that the 
whole corpus of the Supreme Court’s Indian law is simply incoherent.20 There is no 
point, these accounts argue, in trying to find any conceptual order in the decisional 
chaos. 
Perhaps these explanations are correct in part, but none is correct in whole. To a 
greater or lesser extent, these analyses overlook or minimize two important points. 
First, the Supreme Court has not categorically abandoned or repudiated tribal 
sovereignty. During the same term that it denied tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians in Oliphant, the Supreme Court affirmed the longstanding concept of 
retained, inherent tribal sovereignty in two leading cases—Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, which held that federal courts generally may not review tribal-court 
interpretations of the federal Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,21 and United States v. 
Wheeler, which held that a tribal government and the federal government are separate 
sovereigns for purposes of the Fifth Amendment prohibition on double jeopardy.22 
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions, most notably in the area of tribal sovereign 
immunity, have stated repeatedly that Indian tribes have retained, inherent 
                                                                                                                 
 
Nevada v. Hicks and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
288 (2003); Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment and 
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147 (1999–2000); Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and 
Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219. 
 17. See infra Section II.A. 
 18. See infra Section II.B. 
 19. Ned Blackhawk, A New History of Native Americans Responds to ‘Bury My Heart at 
Wounded Knee’, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/books 
/review/david-treuer-heartbeat-wounded-knee.html?searchResultPosition=1 
[https://perma.cc/XYB2-E5R4]. 
 20. See infra Section II.C. 
 21. 436 U.S. 49, 52 (1978). 
 22. 435 U.S. 313, 328–30 (1978). 
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sovereignty.23 Against those authorities, arguments that the Supreme Court has 
rejected tribal sovereignty are misplaced. 
Second, in the years since World War II, the Supreme Court’s decisions outside 
Indian law have turned toward the wholesale expansion of fundamental rights. This 
is the rights revolution largely associated with the Warren Court—but with roots in 
the Stone and Vinson Courts and with continuing vitality through the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts.24 From criminal procedure and civil liberties to 
private property and the free exercise of religion, the contemporary Supreme Court 
has reorganized large tracts of public law around fundamental rights. Long gone are 
the days when Justice Holmes and Justice Frankfurter maintained a posture of 
judicial deference to the political branches, and long gone are the days when few 
provisions in the Bill of Rights applied to state and local governments. Today, an 
overriding concern of the Supreme Court is with the rights of individuals against the 
government, from the federal level all the way down to the lowest level of local 
government. But the Indian tribes have no formal place within this framework; the 
Constitution places tribal governments entirely outside the federalist structure. No 
less importantly for these purposes, the rights provisions of the Constitution—
including the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment—do not apply to tribal 
governments. The rights revolution and tribal sovereignty simply do not intersect. 
That is where the trouble starts. I argue that the Supreme Court fully understands 
retained, inherent tribal sovereignty; more controversially, I argue that the Supreme 
Court wants to preserve retained, inherent tribal sovereignty. But the Supreme Court 
also wants to preserve and, in many cases, enlarge the fundamental rights that it has 
recognized, created, expanded, and incorporated in the postwar period.25 And it 
wants to preserve the placement of tribal governments outside the federalist structure. 
Those objectives are incompatible; the Court cannot achieve all three 
simultaneously. This presents the Supreme Court with a classic trilemma. The Court 
can pursue any two of the objectives, but it necessarily must compromise the third. 
If tribal governments exercise full territorial sovereignty over Indian country but 
remain outside the federalist structure, nonmembers must lose their fundamental 
rights with respect to tribal governmental action. If tribal governments exercise full 
territorial sovereignty over Indian country but nonmembers can assert their 
fundamental rights against tribal governmental action, tribal governments must be 
forced into the federalist structure and treated as though they were state or local 
governments. And if tribal governments remain outside the federalist structure but 
nonmembers retain their fundamental rights, tribal governments must lose their 
territorial jurisdiction. Forced to choose among these outcomes, the Supreme Court 
has moved from the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty to 
the contemporary, membership-based definition. For the Court, this approach best 
accommodates the competing claims of tribal sovereignty, fundamental rights, and 
the constitutional limits of federalism. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 787–88 (2014); Kiowa 
Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754–58 (1998); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. 
Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 
130, 136–52 (1982). 
 24. See infra Section I.B.  
 25. See infra Section I.C.  
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My thesis is straightforward. The line of Supreme Court cases restricting tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers redefines tribal sovereignty for the era of fundamental 
rights. In the view of the Supreme Court, the traditional, territorial-based definition 
of tribal sovereignty worked tolerably well before the rights revolution. Contact 
between tribal governments and nonmembers was infrequent; and in any event, 
critical provisions of the Bill of Rights lay dormant or unincorporated even against 
the states. From the Court’s perspective, no great harm came from allowing tribal 
governments to assert jurisdiction over nonmembers and non-Indians in Indian 
country. But once it began to view its constitutional role as including the protection 
of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court became increasingly troubled by the 
territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty. What sense did it make, the Court 
asked, to force Arizona or Wyoming to respect the fundamental rights of its citizens 
if those citizens lost their rights as soon as they entered the Navajo Nation or the 
Wind River Indian Reservation? The resolution that the Supreme Court has pursued 
since Oliphant is to cast tribal sovereignty in terms of membership rather than 
territory. That, in my view, is the best explanation for this challenging line of cases. 
My argument should not be misunderstood. For the most part, my objective is to 
offer an interpretive account, not a normative one. I am not arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s redefinition of tribal sovereignty is the right answer to the tribal-sovereignty 
trilemma. Because of the longstanding scholarly questions about those cases, I am 
interested primarily in understanding what the Supreme Court has been doing, not 
what the Supreme Court should be doing. In general, my sympathies lie with those 
who favor a more robust form of tribal sovereignty, but I try to set those sympathies 
aside for the sake of a clearer analysis of the Court’s decisions. Even if I conclude 
that the Supreme Court is normatively mistaken, I must also conclude that these cases 
represent an intelligent, good-faith attempt to preserve tribal sovereignty. For that 
reason, I cannot agree with the scholarly views that the Court’s contemporary Indian-
law cases are uninformed, incoherent, hostile, or racist. 
The argument is set out as follows. Part I analyzes the Supreme Court’s new 
definition of tribal sovereignty as the Court’s resolution of the tribal-sovereignty 
trilemma. This part examines the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal 
sovereignty dating back to the Marshall Court, explains the historical developments 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that brought Indians and non-Indians 
into more frequent contact, recounts the rights revolution of the postwar decades, and 
explains more fully how the contemporary, membership-based definition of tribal 
sovereignty represents a choice among incompatible objectives. Part II reviews 
competing explanations in the scholarly literature and identifies their shortcomings, 
limitations, and (in some cases) errors. Part III moves beyond the interpretive 
approach of Part I and the critical approach of Part II to consider possible paths 
forward. In that part, I argue that what may be the most desirable outcome—
revitalizing the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty—may 
also be the least attainable. Similarly, I argue that what may be the easiest outcome—
full incorporation of tribal governments into the constitutional order—may also be 
the least desirable. Instead, the law seems likely to continue down the Supreme 
Court’s chosen path until it reaches the end point of tribal sovereignty based entirely 
(or very nearly entirely) on tribal membership. 
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I. THE TRIBAL-SOVEREIGNTY TRILEMMA  
The Supreme Court has long recognized the retained, inherent sovereignty of 
American Indian tribes—a sovereignty that predates contact with the European 
colonizing powers and that, accordingly, does not derive from the U.S. Constitution, 
from acts of Congress, or from decisions of the Supreme Court.26 And the Court long 
defined this sovereignty in terms of territory—so that each tribe was sovereign with 
respect to that tribe’s lands. But in 1978, the Court changed course and began to 
define tribal sovereignty in terms of membership.27 Although the doctrinal shift was 
abrupt, the legal, political, and demographic developments underlying it had 
unfolded over the previous century.28 To the Court, the redefinition of tribal 
sovereignty in terms of membership rather than territory appeared to provide the best 
resolution of an intractable conflict among competing positions in federal Indian and 
constitutional law.29 
The underlying problem is a classic trilemma. The assertion of tribal criminal and 
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers implicates three incompatible legal objectives. 
First is the preservation of the traditional definition of tribal sovereignty—that is, the 
sovereignty of tribal governments over all persons and all activities on tribal lands. 
Second is the preservation of tribal governments’ placement outside the federalist 
structure—that is, the exemption of tribal governments from the constraints imposed 
on the federal and state governments by the individual-rights provisions of the 
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Third is 
the preservation of those fundamental rights—that is, the assurance to all persons 
that, under the Constitution, the exercise of governmental power cannot violate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 206–11; see also 
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). A 1934 opinion of the solicitor of the Interior 
Department summarized the law on this point in the following terms:  
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of 
decisions hereinafter analyzed, is the principle that those powers which are 
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certain basic rights such as the free exercise of religion and the right against self-
incrimination. These three objectives present a trilemma; any rule concerning tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers can realize two—but not all three—of the objectives 
simultaneously.  
The problem is directly analogous to what economists know as the “Mundell-
Fleming Trilemma” (also called the “Impossible Trinity”).30 The Mundell-Fleming 
Trilemma holds that the policy objectives of fixed currencies, monetary autonomy, 
and capital mobility cannot all be realized at the same time.31 A simple depiction of 
that trilemma places the three incompatible objectives at the vertices of a triangle and 
locates the policy outcomes, which are determined by choosing any two of the three 
objectives, along the sides of the triangle.32 Following that approach, the tribal-
sovereignty trilemma may be depicted as follows, with the three competing 
objectives indicated in boldface at the vertices of the triangle and the three possible 
outcomes indicated in italics along the sides of the triangle.  
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Consider now the options for resolving the trilemma. The Supreme Court might 
decide to realize the two objectives located at the upper and lower right vertices of 
the triangle—the preservation of the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal 
sovereignty and the preservation of tribal governments’ placement outside the 
federalist structure. Selection of those two objectives would lead the Court to the 
outcome on the right side of the triangle, allowing tribal governments to assert full 
jurisdiction over all persons and all activities within tribal lands but not allowing 
individuals to assert fundamental rights as trumps over tribal governmental power. 
Under this approach, the Court would have to sacrifice the objective at the lower left 
vertex—that is, the objective directly opposite the chosen outcome; it would not be 
able to preserve fundamental rights in the context of tribal sovereignty. Thus, a tribal 
court, for example, would not be required to observe the limitations of the Fourth or 
Fifth Amendment in a criminal trial.  
The Supreme Court might decide instead to realize the objectives located at the 
upper and lower left vertices—the preservation of the traditional, territorial-based 
definition of tribal sovereignty and the preservation of fundamental rights. Selection 
of those two objectives would lead the Court to the outcome on the left side of the 
triangle, allowing tribal governments to assert full jurisdiction over all persons and 
all activities within tribal lands and allowing individuals to assert their fundamental 
rights as trumps over tribal-governmental power. But the Court would have to 
sacrifice the objective directly opposite the policy outcome—in this case, the 
preservation of the tribal governments’ placement outside the federalist structure. In 
effect, tribal governments would be forced into the federalist structure and treated as 
state and local governments under the Incorporation Doctrine.  
The Court instead has pursued the third approach. The Court effectively has 
decided to realize the objectives located at the lower right and the lower left 
vertices—the preservation of tribal governments’ placement outside the federalist 
structure and the preservation of fundamental rights.33 That has led the Court to the 
outcome on the bottom side of the triangle, denying tribal sovereignty over 
nonmembers. Correspondingly, the Court’s approach has sacrificed the objective at 
the top vertex—the preservation of the traditional, territorial-based definition of 
tribal sovereignty. In deciding not to incorporate constitutional rights protections 
against tribal governments but to preserve fundamental rights as trumps on 
governmental power, the Court left itself with no choice but to redefine tribal 
sovereignty.  
The Supreme Court has not articulated its decisions in these terms, and there have 
been fits and starts along the way as the Court has worked through the specific 
implications of the doctrinal turn initiated by Oliphant.34 Additionally, Congress at 
times has intervened to overturn particular decisions denying tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers and non-Indians.35 But all the same, this trilemma framework best 
explains how and why the Court has undertaken to redefine tribal sovereignty. A 
fuller understanding of the trilemma requires an appreciation of how it arose during 
the last quarter of the twentieth century. That, in turn, requires a closer examination 
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 35. See supra note 11. 
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of the Court’s tribal-sovereignty cases, the substantial legal and demographic 
developments within Indian country since the nineteenth century, and the emergence 
of the fundamental-rights era during the decades after the Second World War. 
A. Tribal Sovereignty Redefined 
Law normally defines sovereignty in territorial terms. The government of the 
United States claims sovereignty over all lands within its borders and over certain 
overseas territories and possessions. So too does the Hellenic Republic; so too does 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. And consistent with that, 
the government of the United States, along with the governments of the fifty 
constituent states, generally asserts criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons 
and activities within its lands, as do the governments of Greece and the United 
Kingdom with respect to their lands. The relationship between sovereignty and 
territorial-based jurisdiction is so close that it almost seems tautological: to claim 
sovereignty is very nearly the same as asserting jurisdiction over everyone and 
everything within the claimant’s territory, and to assert jurisdiction over everyone 
and everything within the claimant’s territory is very nearly the same as claiming 
sovereignty. “A basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty,” says the U.S. Supreme 
Court, “is the power to enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign’s 
territory, whether citizens or aliens.”36 
But the relationship is so close only because it is so familiar, not because it is 
strictly necessary. Jurisdiction can be defined in other terms. The Germanic barbarian 
kingdoms of the early Middle Ages, for example, divided jurisdiction by ethnicity 
and tribe, not by geography.37 A Salic Frank was entitled to the benefits of Salic law 
no matter where he or she happened to be; similarly, a Burgundian was entitled to 
Burgundian law, and a Visigoth was entitled to Visigothic law.38 And for centuries 
after overrunning the western empire, the Germanic barbarians generally continued 
to apply Roman law to the Romans.39 Jurisdiction was personal rather than territorial, 
even if sovereignty was territorial rather than personal. 
For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court defined tribal sovereignty in territorial 
terms. The touchstone decision is the 1832 opinion by Chief Justice Marshall in 
Worcester v. Georgia.40 The Georgia legislature, as part of a broader effort to destroy 
the government of the Cherokee Nation and to open Cherokee lands for non-Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990). 
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settlement, passed a statute that, inter alia, proscribed “white persons” from residing 
in Cherokee lands without first pledging loyalty to the constitution and the laws of 
Georgia and obtaining a license from the Georgia governor.41 Samuel Worcester, a 
non-Indian Congregationalist minister who lived and worked among the Cherokees 
and who ignored the pledge and license requirements, was convicted under the 
Georgia statute and sentenced to four years of hard labor.42 Over one dissenting vote, 
the Supreme Court held the Georgia statute unconstitutional and reversed 
Worcester’s conviction.43 In the majority opinion, Marshall reasoned that the Indian 
Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gave the federal 
government—rather than the individual states—the exclusive power to regulate 
commerce with the Indian tribes.44 
No less importantly, Marshall articulated a vision of tribal sovereignty as 
territorial and subordinate only to the power of the U.S. government. Marshall wrote 
that various statutes passed by Congress, including the Trade and Intercourse Act of 
1802,45 “manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political 
communities, having territorial boundaries within which their authority is 
exclusive.”46 He added:  
The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community occupying its own 
territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no 
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in 
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.47  
Marshall, then, plainly stated that the reach of state law ends at the border of Indian 
country and that Indian law, subject only to overriding federal law, controls within 
Indian country. In the words of Judge Canby, one of the leading scholars of federal 
Indian law: “Worcester leaves little question that in Marshall’s view, the tribes were 
inherently empowered to govern everything that happened within their territories. 
The boundaries of tribal power were essentially geographical . . . .”48  
This territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty generally remained in effect 
until 1978, although federal Indian law occasionally strayed from Worcester. In 1817 
(fifteen years before Worcester), Congress had passed the Indian Country Crimes 
Act, which confers federal jurisdiction over mixed-race crimes within Indian 
country—that is, crimes involving an Indian victim and a non-Indian offender or an 
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Indian offender and a non-Indian victim.49 But the Indian Country Crimes Act simply 
introduces federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian country; it does not displace tribal 
criminal jurisdiction.50 In fact, the Indian Country Crimes Act permits a tribe to 
preempt federal criminal jurisdiction by punishing an Indian offender before the 
offender is subjected to federal prosecution.51 In 1885, Congress passed the Major 
Crimes Act, which confers federal jurisdiction over certain felonies within Indian 
country involving an Indian offender and an Indian victim.52 Again, however, the 
Major Crimes Act apparently does not preempt concurrent tribal criminal 
jurisdiction, although the question remains unsettled.53 Between those two statutes, 
the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, provides that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”54 The proviso (“subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof”) excluded tribal members, implying that tribal jurisdiction 
over tribal members was not limited to tribal lands—a point later confirmed by the 
Supreme Court.55 It does not, however, imply that tribal governments lack 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribal lands. 
More difficult to reconcile with Worcester are the Supreme Court’s 1881 decision 
in United States v. McBratney56 and its 1896 decision in Draper v. United States.57 
In each of those cases, the Court ruled that the state government, rather than the 
federal government, had criminal jurisdiction over a crime committed within Indian 
country by a non-Indian offender against a non-Indian victim.58 McBratney and 
Draper do not specifically say that tribal governments lack jurisdiction over such 
crimes, but the flat inconsistency of those decisions with the Worcester language 
about state laws having “no force” within Indian country suggests as much. 
McBratney and Draper effectively hold that Indian country is not Indian country 
when a non-Indian commits a crime against a non-Indian. If the non-Indian status of 
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the offender and the victim displaces federal jurisdiction, it presumably displaces 
tribal jurisdiction as well.59 
Nonetheless, the territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty generally 
remained in place well into the twentieth century. In 1934, the solicitor of the 
Department of the Interior described the criminal and civil jurisdiction of tribal courts 
in territorial terms:  
So long as the complete and independent sovereignty of an Indian tribe 
was recognized, its criminal jurisdiction, no less than its civil 
jurisdiction, was that of any sovereign power. It might punish its subjects 
for offenses against each other or against aliens and for public offenses 
against the peace and dignity of the tribe. Similarly, it might punish aliens 
within its jurisdiction according to its own laws and customs. Such 
jurisdiction continues to this day, save as it has been expressly limited 
by the acts of a superior government.60 
In the opinion of the solicitor, then, the original criminal and civil jurisdiction of 
the Indian tribes “was that of any sovereign power.” This included power over a 
tribe’s own “subjects” and over “aliens.” That jurisdiction persists, the solicitor 
argued, “save as it has been expressly limited by the acts of a superior government”—
which, of course, includes federal statutes and decisions such as McBratney and 
Draper.61  
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the territorial-based definition of tribal 
sovereignty in 1959, when it decided Williams v. Lee.62 In that case, the Court held 
that the Arizona state courts had no jurisdiction to hear a civil suit brought by a non-
Indian plaintiff against an Indian defendant for collection of a debt arising from a 
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transaction within Indian country.63 After reviewing Worcester,64 Justice Black’s 
majority opinion stated that “Congress has . . . acted consistently upon the 
assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a 
reservation.”65 In upholding exclusive tribal-court jurisdiction, Black argued: “[T]o 
allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here . . . would infringe on the right of the 
Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He 
was on the Reservation, and the transaction with an Indian took place there.”66 The 
Supreme Court, Black concluded, has “consistently guarded the authority of Indian 
governments over their reservations . . . . If this power is to be taken away from them, 
it is for Congress to do it.”67  
The Court followed Williams in its 1975 decision United States v. Mazurie.68 In 
that case, two non-Indians had been convicted in federal court of “introducing 
spirituous beverages into Indian country” in violation of a federal statute that allowed 
Indian tribes to control the sale of alcohol on their lands.69 In a unanimous decision, 
Justice Rehnquist held that the non-delegation doctrine did not invalidate the federal 
statute.70 Citing Worcester, Rehnquist wrote that “Indian tribes are unique 
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their 
territory.”71 The Court held it irrelevant that the non-Indian defendants “could not 
become members of the tribe, and therefore could not participate in tribal 
government.”72 Williams, the Court said, had already established “that the authority 
of tribal courts could extend over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their transactions 
on a reservation with Indians.”73 Thus, allowing for the important but limited 
McBratney and Draper exception of a crime committed by a non-Indian against a 
non-Indian within Indian country, the Supreme Court from Worcester through 
Mazurie consistently defined tribal sovereignty in territorial terms.  
That changed abruptly in 1978 when the Supreme Court decided Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe.74 The Court in Oliphant held that an Indian tribe has no 
criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian, even for an offense committed against an 
Indian within Indian country.75 In a 6-2 decision, the Court reversed the convictions 
of two non-Indians who, in separate incidents on the Port Madison Indian 
Reservation, had been arrested by tribal police and charged with resisting arrest, 
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assaulting a tribal officer, reckless endangerment, and damaging tribal property.76 
Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion comprised two distinct arguments. Rehnquist 
argued first that, although “[t]he effort by Indian tribal courts to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . is a relatively new phenomenon,”77 Indian tribes 
had never been understood by Congress, the executive, or the lower federal courts to 
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders.78 Academic commentators 
generally have criticized this part of the opinion as historically inaccurate.79 
Of much greater significance is the second argument, setting out what is now 
known as the “implicit-divestiture theory.”80 In that part of the opinion, Rehnquist 
said that, by submitting to the authority of the U.S. government, Indian tribes 
necessarily lost certain attributes of sovereignty—that the tribes have been implicitly 
divested of particular sovereign powers by reason of their dependent status.81 Among 
these lost attributes of sovereignty, Rehnquist wrote, are the legal capacity to alienate 
tribal lands to any transferee other than the U.S. government82—that had been the 
holding of the Marshall Court’s 1823 decision in Johnson v. McIntosh83—and the 
legal capacity to treat directly with foreign governments84—that had been part of the 
reasoning of the Marshall Court’s 1831 decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.85 
The Oliphant opinion thus reached back a century and a half to Johnson and 
Cherokee Nation, devised the implicit-divestiture theory to explain them, and turned 
that implicit-divestiture theory directly against tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians. “By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States,” 
Rehnquist concluded, “Indian tribes . . . necessarily give up their power to try non-
Indian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”86 
The decision was a major blow to advocates of tribal sovereignty. By 1978, it had 
long been understood that, apart from the two exceptions recognized by Johnson and 
Cherokee Nation, Indian tribes retain all attributes of sovereignty other than those 
specifically surrendered by treaty or agreement with the United States and those 
specifically taken away by act of Congress. Now Oliphant indicated that the judiciary 
would place further limits on tribal sovereignty, subject only to the possibility of 
legislative override. To compound matters, the opinion did not establish how far the 
implicit-divesture theory might reach. On the criminal side, the Court ultimately 
determined that the theory reaches very far. In its 1990 decision Duro v. Reina, the 
Supreme Court, relying on the implicit-divestiture theory, held by a 7-2 vote that an 
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Indian tribe cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction for a crime committed within Indian 
country by an Indian who is not a member of the tribe.87 The decision actually created 
a jurisdictional gap such that no government—federal, state, or tribal—had 
jurisdiction for certain offenses committed by nonmember Indians.88 Congress 
quickly addressed that, overturning Duro by statute,89 and the Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the remedial legislation in United States v. Lara.90 As a result, 
an Indian tribe today may exercise criminal jurisdiction over any Indian, whether or 
not a member of the tribe, but it may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over a non-
Indian, except with respect to certain offenses specified in the federal Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968.91 
In the meantime, the Supreme Court turned the implicit-divestiture theory against 
tribal civil-regulatory and civil-adjudicative jurisdiction. In its 1981 decision 
Montana v. United States, the Court, relying on Oliphant, unanimously held that an 
Indian tribe cannot regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on lands within 
Indian country that are owned in fee simple by nonmembers.92 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Stewart said that tribal authority is confined primarily to matters affecting the 
tribe and its members to the exclusion of matters affecting nonmembers: “[E]xercise 
of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to 
control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and 
so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”93 
 But Stewart also wrote that the prohibition on tribal civil-regulatory jurisdiction 
is not absolute. Under what are known as the “two Montana exceptions,” Stewart 
said that a tribe may exercise civil-regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers for 
activities on nonmember lands if the nonmembers enter into “consensual 
relationships” with the tribe or its members or if the nonmembers’ “conduct threatens 
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or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the 
health or welfare of the tribe.”94 Furthermore, Stewart said unequivocally that a tribe 
may exercise civil-regulatory jurisdiction over a nonmember for activities on tribal 
lands.95 Under Montana, then, the implicit-divestiture theory restricts a tribe’s civil 
jurisdiction less than it does a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction. Oliphant categorically 
denies criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians even on tribal lands within the 
reservation; Montana preserves civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on tribal lands 
and recognizes two exceptions to the general rule denying civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers on nonmember lands.  
Subsequent cases further restricted tribal civil authority over nonmembers. In a 
messy 4-2-3 decision from 1989, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, the Supreme Court held that the second Montana exception 
allows an Indian tribe to exercise zoning authority over some (but not all) of the lands 
owned by nonmembers within the tribe’s reservation.96 In 2001, the Court in 
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, finding neither Montana exception applicable, 
unanimously held that a tribe may not impose an occupancy tax on a hotel operated 
on nonmember land within the tribe’s reservation.97 Along the way, the Court 
inserted a remarkable footnote into its 1993 decision in South Dakota v. Bourland.98 
Holding that two federal statutes had abrogated the treaty rights of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux to regulate nonmember hunting and fishing within the tribe’s 
reservation, Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court read Montana as a categorical 
denial of inherent tribal sovereignty over nonmembers: “[A]fter Montana,” Thomas 
wrote, “tribal sovereignty over nonmembers ‘cannot survive without express 
congressional delegation’ . . . and is therefore not inherent.”99 Subsequent decisions 
of the Court generally have ignored that sweeping statement—although it may yet 
prove a prescient summary of the implicit-divestiture cases.  
The implicit-divestiture theory has had similar limiting effects on tribal civil-
adjudicative authority. In 1997, the Supreme Court unanimously held in Strate v. A-
1 Contractors that a tribal court may not exercise jurisdiction over a civil action 
involving nonmember parties on non-tribal land within the tribe’s reservation unless 
one of the two Montana exceptions applies.100 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
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Court, said that “[a]s to nonmembers . . . a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not 
exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”101 In other words, the implicit-divestiture theory, 
as articulated in Montana, applies to both civil regulation and civil adjudication. 
Then, stating that the Montana exceptions are “limited” and should not “swallow the 
rule” or “shrink it,” the Court in 2008 held by a 5-4 vote in Plains Commerce Bank 
v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co. that, notwithstanding a commercial relationship 
between tribal members and a nonmember bank, a tribal court lacked jurisdiction 
over litigation involving a claim against the bank arising from its sale of nonmember 
reservation land.102 
Montana at least preserved tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers for activities 
on tribal lands.103 But two subsequent cases have weakened the significance of the 
distinction between tribal lands and nonmember lands. In 2001, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held in Nevada v. Hicks that a tribal court may not exercise jurisdiction 
over a civil suit brought by a tribal member against a state law-enforcement officer 
for conduct that occurred on tribal land.104 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia 
cautioned that the holding was “limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction 
over state officers enforcing state law” and that the decision left “open the question 
of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general.”105 But Scalia also 
said that land ownership is only one factor in determining tribal jurisdiction and that 
“tribal ownership is not alone enough to support . . . jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.”106 Contrary to Montana, then, Hicks indicates that the distinction 
between tribal lands and nonmember lands is not necessarily controlling.107 More 
recently, Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians squarely 
presented the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over a nonmember for conduct on 
tribal lands (without the complication of state law enforcement present in Hicks).108 
The case was argued in December of 2015; after Justice Scalia’s death in February 
of 2016, the Court split 4-4 and issued no opinion.109 Four justices, apparently, were 
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prepared to hold that a tribe may not exercise civil-adjudicative jurisdiction over a 
nonmember even for activity on tribal lands.110 
Thus, the transformation of tribal sovereignty from traditional, territorial-based 
sovereignty to contemporary, membership-based sovereignty is still unfolding. Until 
1978, tribal sovereignty worked much like the sovereignty of every other nation and 
every other government. With the exception of crimes committed by a non-Indian 
offender against a non-Indian victim, tribes had criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
all persons, whether Indian or non-Indian, for all activities within Indian country 
(although the extent to which any tribe actually exercised criminal or civil 
jurisdiction over nonmembers during that period is, of course, a separate question). 
But under the implicit-divestiture theory, first announced in 1978, tribes have no 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders, even for crimes occurring on tribal 
lands within Indian country, and tribes have very limited civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers for activities on nonmember lands within Indian country. It seems 
likely that the Supreme Court eventually will deny all tribal-civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers, even for activities on tribal lands within Indian country. Hicks opened 
that door; in Dollar General, four Justices were willing to walk through it. The 
guiding principle of the Supreme Court’s opinions is perfectly clear. Tribal 
sovereignty is not territorial; unless Congress provides otherwise, a tribe is sovereign 
only as to its own members.  
B. Tribal Governments and the Rights Revolution 
The Supreme Court’s shift from the traditional, territorial-based definition of 
tribal sovereignty to the contemporary, membership-based definition has played out 
against the background of two broader developments in federal Indian law and U.S. 
constitutional law. First, legislative and executive policy during the century 
preceding Oliphant abandoned the longstanding practice of separating Indians from 
non-Indians and eventually encouraged the development of tribal political 
institutions and tribal economic enterprises.111 An important consequence of those 
changes was an increase in contacts between tribal governments and nonmembers 
unmediated by the federal government.112 Second, during the decades after World 
War II, the Supreme Court abandoned the policy of judicial deference to the political 
branches observed by Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter in the twilight of 
the Lochner era.113 After tentative first steps by the Stone and Vinson Courts, the 
Court under Chief Justice Warren undertook to reshape constitutional law by 
aggressively recognizing, creating, expanding, and incorporating fundamental 
rights.114 When tribal governments then asserted sovereign powers over nonmembers 
in criminal and civil proceedings during the second half of the twentieth century, the 
latent tension between these two developments became apparent.115 
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1. The Decline of Separation and the Rise of Tribal Governments 
 For much of its first century, the U.S. government’s general policy toward 
American Indians was to separate them—physically, culturally, and politically—
from non-Indians. Although there had been early efforts aimed at assimilation, 
federal policy under President Madison swung hard toward removal—the forced 
migration of Indian tribes from lands east of the Mississippi River to lands west of 
the Mississippi River.116 Policy makers could reasonably assume that, because 
colonial and early republican settlement had needed two centuries to fill in the region 
between the Atlantic seaboard and the Appalachian Mountains, further settlement 
would need another two centuries to fill in the region between the Appalachians and 
the Mississippi River. Western removal of the eastern tribes thus seemed to offer a 
long-term solution to what was known as the “Indian problem.”117 Tribal members, 
for the most part, were not U.S. citizens, and the tribes themselves were regarded as 
separate nations.118 Forced migration from their lands would permit the tribes to 
preserve their political independence and, of course, open the lands for non-Indian 
settlement.119  
The removal policy quickly fell apart. Non-Indian settlement took only a few 
years—not decades and certainly not centuries—to cross the Mississippi River, and 
conflicts arose between non-Indian settlers and both the western tribes and the 
removed eastern tribes.120 By 1858, the legislative and executive branches had turned 
to reservations as the new long-term policy.121 Tribes would be confined to 
reservations, the lands of which would be held by the United States for the exclusive 
use and benefit of the tribes.122 The reservation system thus would continue the 
separation of tribes from non-Indians. It would allow Indians a measure of 
independence—and, again, it would free up most of their lands for non-Indian 
settlement. As the nineteenth century wore on, policy makers increasingly looked on 
the reservation system as a mechanism to prepare Indians for ultimate assimilation.123 
Many tribal political, cultural, and social practices were discouraged or simply 
prohibited.124 But Indians largely remained peoples apart within the United States. 
That changed after Congress passed the General Allotment Act of 1887 (also 
known as the “Dawes Act”).125 Under the new policy of allotment, federal officials 
surveyed reservation lands, assigned parcels between 40 and 160 acres to individual 
Indians and their families, held back certain parcels for continued tribal use, and 
opened up the “surplus” reservation lands for purchase by non-Indian settlers.126 The 
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motives underlying allotment were mixed.127 Some policy makers reasoned that 
Indian economic development on the reservations was held back by communal 
landownership; it would be better, they thought, if individual Indians could be turned 
into yeomen with family farms (like their non-Indian counterparts).128 Other policy 
makers simply wanted to make reservation lands available for non-Indian 
settlement.129 In any event, the effect was that federal policy now affirmatively 
discouraged the separation of Indians and non-Indians. U.S. citizenship was first held 
out as an incentive for cooperation with the allotment policy and then simply granted 
to all Indians en masse in 1924.130 
The allotment policy—just like the earlier removal and reservation policies—
proved a monumental failure, and Congress formally renounced it with the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934.131 But allotment had two substantial and lasting effects. 
First, tribal landholdings fell substantially, from 138 million acres at the beginning 
of the allotment period to 48 million acres at the end of it.132 Second, reservations 
became “checkerboards” of tribal and non-tribal lands.133 Although many 
reservations still have a majority of Indian landownership and Indian residency, 
others are primarily non-Indian by land or by population. The Port Madison Indian 
Reservation, where the criminal activity underlying Oliphant took place, offers an 
extreme example. At the time of the Oliphant decision in 1978, more than sixty 
percent of the reservation land was owned by non-Indians, and more than ninety-
eight percent of the reservation population was non-Indian.134 For many places 
within Indian country, allotment meant that Indians and non-Indians were now living 
and working cheek by jowl.  
Congress replaced the allotment policy first with the Indian New Deal—a federal 
effort begun in the 1930s to rebuild tribal institutions and tribal culture, which met 
with mixed success135—and then with a policy of termination—a federal effort begun 
in the 1950s to destroy tribal institutions and tribal culture, which was largely 
reversed once it also proved a failure.136 The current approach is a federal policy of 
tribal self-determination,137 variously attributed to President Kennedy, President 
Johnson, or President Nixon. In 1970, President Nixon delivered a special message 
to Congress in which he called for greater tribal autonomy without loss of federal 
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support—a policy, he said, of “self-determination without termination.”138 The 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, along with other 
legislation that followed the special message, encourages tribal self-government and 
allows tribes to administer many federal health, education, and welfare programs on 
their reservations.139 
Since the start of the self-determination era, many tribes have experienced 
significant political and economic advances.140 Tribal governments have grown 
increasingly complex, often (but not always) involving representative legislative 
bodies and the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.141 Many 
tribes have well-developed judicial systems, including distinct trial and appellate 
courts.142 Tribes determine their own membership; they maintain police, fire, and 
rescue services; they impose taxes; they maintain hospitals, health departments, and 
school systems; they regulate the natural resources of their reservations; they 
legislate for the health, safety, welfare, and morals of their members; and they 
operate business enterprises—some of which (particularly in the gaming and tourist 
industries) have been very successful.143 In many respects, a reservation resident, 
whether Indian or non-Indian, might be hard pressed to distinguish the functions and 
the operations of a tribal government from the functions and the operations of a 
nearby city, county, or state government. But there is an important difference. A 
tribal government remains a tribal government. It is neither the federal government 
nor a state government; as such, it stands outside the federalist structure of the U.S. 
constitutional order. 
2. The Rights Revolution 
 The placement of tribal governments outside the federalist structure took on new 
significance during the post-war years as the Supreme Court turned to the energetic 
recognition, creation, expansion, and incorporation of fundamental rights.144 For both 
civil and criminal matters, the Court during the 1950s and the 1960s abandoned the 
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posture of deference that had defined its constitutional decisions since 1937, and it 
began aggressively pursuing a rights-oriented agenda. Although this rights revolution 
was most frenetic during the Warren and Burger Courts, it continues even now. But 
under the Supreme Court’s long-standing decisions, the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment do not constrain tribal governments.145 That sets up a 
conflict between tribal sovereignty and fundamental rights. 
Apart from disingenuous rhetoric at Senate confirmation hearings, the idea of 
judicial restraint has largely disappeared from contemporary constitutional 
adjudication. The extraordinary deference to the legislative and executive branches 
urged by Holmes, Brandeis, Frankfurter, and others near and after the end of the 
Lochner era now seems distant and foreign.146 But even after the turn toward 
selective incorporation of constitutional rights against the states during the first half 
of the twentieth century, judicial deference—genuine judicial deference—normally 
commanded majority respect through the years of the Stone Court (1941–1946) and 
the Vinson Court (1946–1953).147 Still, the Court occasionally invalidated legislative 
acts trenching on civil liberties and civil rights. In 1943, for example, the Stone Court 
in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette struck down a statute that compelled 
school children to salute the American flag.148 And in 1950, the Vinson Court in 
Sweatt v. Painter ruled that the Equal Protection Clause required that black 
applicants be admitted to the University of Texas Law School.149 For the most part, 
however, the commitment to judicial deference prevailed under Chief Justice Stone 
and Chief Justice Vinson.150 
That changed markedly with the Warren Court (1953–1969). Under Chief Justice 
Warren, the Supreme Court shifted hard to an energetic exercise of the judicial 
power.151 Express constitutional rights—such as freedom of the press, equal 
protection of the laws, and the rights of criminal suspects and criminal defendants—
were greatly expanded; other rights, such as the right of privacy, were created or 
recognized for the first time; and many rights, whether new or old, were incorporated 
against state and local governments.152 The work of the Warren Court was in large 
part to lead a rights revolution, and the idea of judicial deference to the political 
branches as a safeguard of individuals against the government fell decidedly out of 
favor.  
It began, of course, in 1954 with the Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education,153 striking down segregation in the public schools and initiating 
the gradual abandonment of Plessy v. Ferguson154 and the desegregation of other 
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public facilities. During the 1960s, the Warren Court validated federal civil rights 
legislation. In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,155 and in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965.156 As the Court found its footing on the rights of black Americans, it also took 
on the malapportionment of legislative districts, holding first in its 1962 decision, 
Baker v. Carr, that apportionment controversies are justiciable157 and then in its 1964 
decision, Reynolds v. Sims, that those controversies should be decided on the 
principle of “one person, one vote.”158 
The Warren Court expanded the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press and applied those expanded guarantees vigorously 
against federal, state, and local governments.159 In 1964, New York Times v. Sullivan 
largely insulated journalists from state-law liability for libel;160 between 1957 and 
1966, Roth v. United States,161 Jacobellis v. Ohio,162 and Memoirs v. 
Massachusetts163 narrowed the scope of obscenity subject to criminal prosecution; 
and in 1969, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District upheld 
the right of public-school children to protest the Vietnam War.164 In 1965, the Court 
in Griswold v. Connecticut located a right of marital privacy amid the “penumbras” 
and “emanations” of various constitutional rights,165 and the Court extended that 
right of privacy further in its 1969 decision, Stanley v. Georgia, to protect the 
possession and viewing of pornography.166 
The Warren Court was particularly aggressive in expanding the rights of criminal 
suspects and criminal defendants.167 In 1956, Griffin v. Illinois held that indigent 
defendants have a right to a free trial transcript,168 and, in 1963, Gideon v. 
Wainwright held that indigent defendants have a right to a court-appointed 
attorney.169 In 1961, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio applied the exclusionary rule to the 
states for violations of the Fourth Amendment,170 and, in 1963, Brady v. Maryland 
imposed a duty on the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence to the 
accused.171 In 1964, the Court held in Escobedo v. Illinois, that the Sixth Amendment 
allows a criminal defendant to have a lawyer present during police interrogation,172 
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and, in 1966, Miranda v. Arizona held that the Fifth Amendment requires police to 
give warnings against self-incrimination upon taking a suspect into custody.173 
The Supreme Court’s aggressive agenda under Chief Justice Warren produced a 
political backlash, and it was hoped or feared (depending on one’s leanings) with 
each succeeding chief justice that the Court would reverse course and unravel the 
rights revolution.174 Both the hopes and the fears proved misplaced. In the last half 
century, the Supreme Court has never pursued a wholesale rollback of the rights 
created and expanded in the years between Brown v. Board of Education and Chief 
Justice Warren’s retirement. Most of the signal decisions from the early and energetic 
years of the rights revolution remain in place. Instead, the Burger Court (1969–1986), 
the Rehnquist Court (1986–2005), and the Roberts Court (2005–present) each 
continued the creation and expansion of fundamental rights, although at a slower 
pace and with a shift of focus. To this day, the Supreme Court continues to define its 
constitutional work in no small part as the protection of such rights. Perhaps most 
notably, the Court has continued to expand the right of privacy. In 1972, the Court 
held in Eisenstadt v. Baird that the right of married persons to possess contraception, 
which had been recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut, applies as well to unmarried 
persons.175  The next year, the Court held in Roe v. Wade that women have a 
constitutional right to elective abortions176—a decision modified but not overruled 
in 1992 by the Rehnquist Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.177 In 2003, the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas used the right of privacy to strike down state 
criminal sodomy laws.178 In 2013 and 2015, the Roberts Court built on the 
substantive-due-process theories developed under the Warren and Burger Courts to 
require federal and state recognition of same-sex marriage in United States v. 
Windsor179 and Obergefell v. Hodges.180 
The Burger Court expanded the freedom of the press in its 1971 New York Times 
v. United States opinion (known as the “Pentagon Papers Case”).181 The Rehnquist 
Court expanded freedom of speech in its 1989 Texas v. Johnson opinion (the “Flag-
Burning Case”).182 And the Roberts Court further expanded freedom of speech in its 
2010 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission opinion,183 its 2018 Janus v. 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 
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opinion,184 and its 2018 National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra 
opinion.185  
 Finally, the Supreme Court, after Chief Justice Warren, enlarged fundamental 
rights that had long been dormant in constitutional law. The Rehnquist Court 
“reinvigorated” private-property rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.186 After decades of neglecting regulatory takings, the Court created 
new categories of protected property interests for exactions (Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission in 1987187 and Dolan v. City of Tigard in 1994188) and use 
restrictions that deprive a property owner of all economically beneficial use of her 
property (Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council in 1992189). Then, the Roberts 
Court, in 2008, held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual right to bear arms.190 Two years later, the Court in McDonald 
v. Chicago held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment against the states.191 Although its pace and its 
focal points have changed since the days of the Warren Court, the rights revolution 
rolls on. 
3. Tribal Sovereignty and Fundamental Rights 
The rights revolution, however, never really crossed the boundary into Indian 
country. Under Supreme Court case law reaching back to the late nineteenth century, 
tribal governments are not subject to the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. 
And although Congress, in the second half of the twentieth century, imposed select 
constitutional provisions on tribal governments by statute, the Supreme Court 
maintains that claims arising under that statute generally are unreviewable in the 
federal courts. Those points complete the construction of the tribal-sovereignty 
trilemma. Federal law cannot simultaneously maintain the traditional, territorial-
based definition of tribal sovereignty, the robust constitutional protection of 
fundamental rights against governmental power, and the unqualified placement of 
tribal governments outside the federalist structure. One of those three must give way. 
The starting point for understanding the relationship between tribal governments 
and the rights revolution is the 1896 decision of the Supreme Court in Talton v. 
Mayes, which upheld the conviction and death sentence in Cherokee court of Bob 
Talton, a member of the Cherokee Nation who had murdered a fellow Cherokee.192 
Talton argued that the composition of the grand jury that indicted him did not satisfy 
the Fifth Amendment.193 The Supreme Court, by an 8–1 vote (with Justice Harlan in 
dissent), held that the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, does not apply 
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to the Cherokee Nation.194 The sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation, the Court said, 
is inherent; it does not derive from the Constitution, and it cannot be limited by the 
Constitution.195 Even when the Court later began the process of selectively 
incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states, it left Talton undisturbed. To this 
day, the individual-rights provisions of the Constitution remain inapplicable to tribal 
governments.196 To use Justice Kennedy’s somewhat artless term, tribal governments 
are “nonconstitutional entities.”197 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. Id. at 384.  
 195. Id. Even assuming that the Court in Talton correctly held that the Constitution 
generally does not limit the powers of Indian tribal governments, it is not clear that the Court 
correctly applied that principle to the Cherokee Nation because both a treaty and a federal 
statute purported to subject the Cherokee government to the terms of the Constitution. An 
1835 treaty between the Cherokee Nation and the United States recognized: 
[T]o the Cherokee [N]ation the right by their national councils to make and carry 
into effect all such laws as they may deem necessary for the government and 
protection of the persons and property within their own country belonging to their 
people or such persons as have connected themselves with them: provided always 
that they shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States and 
such acts of Congress as have been or may be passed regulating trade and 
intercourse with the Indians . . . .  
Id. at 380 (emphasis added). And an 1890 act of Congress providing a temporary government 
for the Territory of Oklahoma stated that:  
[N]othing in this act shall be so construed as to deprive any of the courts of the 
civilized nations [which included the Cherokee Nation] of exclusive jurisdiction 
over all cases arising wherein members of said nations, whether by treaty, blood 
or adoption, are the sole parties, nor so as to interfere with the right and powers 
of said civilized nations to punish said members for violation of the statutes and 
laws enacted by their national councils where such laws are not contrary to the 
treaties and laws of the United States.  
Id. at 381 (emphasis added). The Talton Court quoted but did not address those provisions. 
 196. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
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of Tribal Sovereignty under the Constitution, 60 MONT. L. REV. 3, 4–11 (1999); see also Erik 
M. Jensen, The End (of this Discussion) of Tribal Sovereignty, 60 MONT. L. REV. 35, 36–37 
(1999); James A. Poore III, The Constitution of the United States Applies to Indian Tribes: A 
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 197. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw 
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That result disturbed members of Congress, particularly as the rights revolution 
gained momentum under the Warren Court.198 Over the objections of the Indian 
lobby,199 Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,200 which applies most 
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments as a matter of federal 
statutory law. For example, the Indian Civil Rights Act requires tribal governments 
to recognize the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of 
the press;201 it prohibits tribal governments from conducting unreasonable searches 
and seizures202 and from subjecting criminal defendants to double jeopardy;203 it 
requires tribal governments to respect the right against self-incrimination204 and to 
provide just compensation for takings of property;205 and it subjects tribal 
governments to the limitations of due process of law and the equal protection of tribal 
laws.206 
Whatever the intentions of Congress, the Indian Civil Rights Act does not bring 
tribal governments within the mainstream of the rights revolution. First, the Indian 
Civil Rights Act specifically omits certain fundamental rights.207 For example, it does 
not prohibit tribal governments from establishing a religion or from restricting the 
right to bear arms, and it does not require tribal governments to provide jury trials 
for civil cases or to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants.208 Second, in 
1978 the Supreme Court held in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez that the federal 
courts have limited jurisdiction under the statute to review claims against tribal 
governments or tribal officials.209 The plaintiff in Martinez sued Santa Clara Pueblo 
and its executive officers in federal court, arguing that the pueblo’s rules for 
determining membership eligibility for the children of pueblo members 
discriminated against women who married outside the pueblo.210 The Supreme Court 
held that the claim against the pueblo was barred by sovereign immunity211 and that 
the claim against the pueblo’s executive officers was barred by the failure of 
Congress to provide federal-court remedies for violations of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act.212 With the sole exception of federal habeas corpus review following a criminal 
conviction in tribal court,213 the Court said, the only remedies for violations of the 
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Indian Civil Rights Act are those provided by the tribe itself.214 Consequently, a tribal 
court’s application of the rights provisions in the Indian Civil Rights Act need not 
correspond to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the corresponding rights 
provisions in the Constitution.215 
In short, several major developments that came together in the late twentieth 
century pushed the Supreme Court into a fundamental reexamination of tribal 
sovereignty. First, the demographic changes effected by the old federal allotment 
policy broke down the longstanding physical separation of Indians and non-Indians. 
By the late twentieth century, substantial numbers of non-Indians lived and worked 
on Indian reservations. Second, the new federal self-determination policy 
encouraged tribal governments to be more assertive in the development of their 
political and economic institutions. For the first time, as contacts between tribal 
governments and non-Indians were increasing, tribal governments exercised 
jurisdiction over civil-regulatory, civil-adjudicative, and criminal matters without 
substantial intermediation or interference by the federal government.216 Third, the 
Supreme Court shifted the focus of constitutional adjudication to the recognition, 
expansion, creation, and incorporation of fundamental rights. From the federal level 
down to the state and local levels, government in the United States found itself more 
constrained by fundamental rights than ever before. Fourth, the Court reaffirmed its 
longstanding position that the rights secured by the Constitution do not bind tribal 
governments and, for good measure, added that the rights secured by the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 are very nearly the exclusive province of tribal courts. 
The result is the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. When it decided Oliphant in 1978, 
the Court finally confronted the stubborn fact that it could not simultaneously 
maintain, without qualification: (1) the traditional, territorial-based definition of 
tribal sovereignty; (2) the protection of fundamental rights against every exercise of 
governmental power within the United States; and (3) the wholesale placement of 
tribal governments outside the federalist structure of the constitutional order. The 
Court understood, however imperfectly, that federal law may provide for any two of 
these but not all three, and the Court determined that the traditional, territorial-based 
definition of tribal sovereignty would have to yield in favor of a membership-based 
definition. Since Oliphant, the Court’s many implicit-divestiture cases have played 
this idea out—slowly and fitfully working the idea consistent, if not pure.  
C. Resolving the Tribal-Sovereignty Trilemma 
Addressing the tribal-sovereignty trilemma forces a hard choice among these 
three incompatible objectives. Many advocates of tribal interests of course prefer that 
the Supreme Court stand firm with the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal 
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2020] REDEFINING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY  119 
 
sovereignty.217 That resolution would recognize tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction 
over all persons and all activities within Indian country; the nature and the extent of 
a tribe’s governmental power would be little different from that of any other 
sovereign. But this would require the Court either to bring tribal governments into 
the federalist structure or to surrender its stewardship of fundamental rights with 
respect to Indian country. Neither option is attractive to the Court. 
Bringing tribal governments into the federalist structure could be achieved by 
overruling Talton and treating tribal governments like state and local governments 
for purposes of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. This would present 
significant problems. Most obviously, it has no clear basis in the Constitution. The 
sole constitutional reference to tribes—the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, 
Section 8—implies that tribes are distinct from state governments, just as they are 
distinct from foreign governments.218 Of course, the Supreme Court has often ruled 
without a clear basis in the Constitution, and a decision to overrule Talton would be 
binding, even if wrong. A less ambitious approach would be to overrule Martinez 
and to allow federal-court review of all claims under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968. That would achieve much the same effect as applying the Constitution directly 
to tribal governments.219 But the Indian Civil Rights Act omits certain constitutional 
rights, such as the right to a jury trial in a civil action and the right to bear arms.220 
Unless Congress were to amend the act to pick up the omitted rights, there would 
still be gaps between the fundamental rights outside Indian country and the 
fundamental rights inside Indian country. 
More importantly, bringing tribal governments into the federalist structure, 
whether directly by overruling Talton or indirectly by overruling Martinez, would 
constitute a serious affront to the political independence and integrity of the tribes. 
The point of self-determination, after all, is self-determination; it is, as the Supreme 
Court said in Williams v. Lee, “the right of reservation Indians to make their own 
laws and be ruled by them.”221 Subjecting tribal governments to the same constraints 
that the Constitution imposes on state and local governments would deny tribal 
members the full capacity to constitute their governments in the manner they deem 
best, to define their civil and criminal laws in accordance with their cultural traditions 
and practices, and to use law and government for the perpetuation of tribal religious 
beliefs.222 In short, it would bring about the assimilation of tribes into a legal system 
defined by non-Indians. 
If the tribes were not forced into the federalist structure, adherence to the 
traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty would require the Court 
to surrender its oversight of fundamental rights with respect to Indian country. 
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Outside Indian country, all the landmark legal developments of the rights revolution 
would remain in effect; within Indian country, a tribe could require loyalty oaths, 
forbid the private ownership of firearms, compel adherence to an established 
religion, prohibit same-sex marriage, maintain racially segregated schools, and 
deprive individuals of liberty and property without the due process of law (at least to 
the extent permitted by a tribal court’s interpretation of the Indian Civil Rights Act). 
Whether a tribal government actually would commit any of those constitutional sins 
is beside the point.223 What matters is that the traditional, territorial-based definition 
of tribal sovereignty would permit a tribal government to violate the fundamental 
rights of both Indians and non-Indians (again, within the limits of a tribal court’s 
interpretation of the Indian Civil Rights Act).224 That result is intolerable to the 
Supreme Court.  
And so the Court, starting with Oliphant in 1978, has pursued the third available 
resolution of the trilemma. Rather than compromise the wholesale placement of tribal 
governments outside the federalist structure or the protections of fundamental rights 
within Indian country, the Court has sacrificed the traditional, territorial-based 
definition of tribal sovereignty. Although it does not frame the implicit-divestiture 
theory as a choice among incompatible objectives expressis verbis, the Court at times 
has invoked the language of fundamental rights and political participation to justify 
its restrictions on tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. In Oliphant, Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion argued that “from the formation of the Union and the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested . . . great solicitude 
that its citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on 
their personal liberty.”225 He acknowledged that, under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 
defendants in tribal-court criminal proceedings “are entitled to many of the due 
process protections accorded to defendants in federal or state criminal proceedings,” 
but he correctly noted that “the guarantees are not identical.”226 Four years later, 
Justice Stevens located these concerns about fundamental rights within the general 
framework of political participation. Dissenting from a decision that allowed a tribe 
to tax a nonmember’s extraction of oil and gas from tribal lands, Stevens argued that 
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“[t]ribal powers over nonmembers are appropriately limited because nonmembers 
are foreclosed from participation in tribal government.”227  
The Court developed Stevens’ idea further in subsequent implicit-divestiture 
cases. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Duro grounded the limits of tribal 
jurisdiction in the Lockean notion that governmental power is justified by the consent 
of the governed. Kennedy’s opinion emphasized that the Indian prosecuted in that 
case by a tribe to which he did not belong was “not entitled to vote in [tribal] 
elections, to hold tribal office, or to serve on tribal juries.”228 The key consideration, 
said Kennedy, is consent: “The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition 
of certain additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be 
tribal members. . . . A tribe’s additional authority comes from the consent of its 
members, and so in the criminal sphere membership marks the bounds of tribal 
authority.”229 And most recently, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Plains 
Commerce Bank recapitulated the consent-based rationale for limiting tribal 
jurisdiction to tribal members. In holding that a tribal court did not have jurisdiction 
over a challenge to a nonmember’s sale of non-tribal land to a nonmember buyer, 
Roberts argued: 
Not only is regulation of fee land sale beyond the tribe’s sovereign 
powers, it runs the risk of subjecting nonmembers to tribal regulatory 
authority without commensurate consent. Tribal sovereignty, it should 
be remembered, is “a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the 
Constitution.” The Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes. Indian 
courts “differ from traditional American courts in a number of significant 
respects.” And nonmembers have no part in tribal government—they 
have no say in the laws and regulations that govern tribal territory. 
Consequently, those laws and regulations may be fairly imposed on 
nonmembers only if the nonmember has consented, either expressly or 
by his actions.230 
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Different members of the Supreme Court have articulated similar concerns at various 
times during oral argument of the implicit-divestiture cases.231 
Importantly, however, the Court’s resolution of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma 
consists not in abandoning the longstanding commitment to tribal sovereignty but in 
redefining it. This redefinition of tribal sovereignty has been particularly difficult to 
understand because it has proceeded fitfully and has produced doctrinally messy 
results. But the Court’s unarticulated aim in the implicit-divestiture cases seems 
tolerably clear. The Court wants to preserve as much of retained, inherent tribal 
sovereignty as possible without either assimilating tribal governments to state and 
local governments or leaving fundamental rights unprotected against tribal-
governmental power. Strange as it may seem (particularly to advocates of tribal 
interests), the implicit-divestiture cases represent a reasoned attempt to address an 
intractable problem.232 
The Court’s new definition of tribal sovereignty incorporates two organizing 
principles, both of which are straightforward, even if their implementation has been 
needlessly confused. The first principle is that a tribal government lacks sovereign 
authority over anyone, Indian or non-Indian, who is not a member of the tribe. The 
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character, its Constitution, or its laws.” 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872). Among these, Miller 
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legislative action? One obvious shortcoming of this possibility, however, is that tribal 
members are themselves U.S. citizens and, thus, would be entitled the same “care and 
protection” from the federal government. But, unsettlingly, that would imply that the implicit-
divestiture cases have not gone far enough and that tribal courts should be divested of 
jurisdiction over nonmembers and members alike. Such a move, of course, would be a very 
serious intrusion on tribal sovereignty. In any event, I am grateful to my colleague John 
Harrison for pointing me to the Slaughter-House Cases as another piece of the puzzle. 
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justification for this principle, in the view of the Court, is that a nonmember does not 
have a political voice in tribal government and cannot have consented to the potential 
loss of his or her fundamental rights. That is the idea, at least. It implies that a tribal 
government should have no criminal or civil jurisdiction over a nonmember for any 
activity, either within or outside Indian country unless the nonmember specifically 
agrees to that jurisdiction.  
In practice, current law strays from this result in several respects. On the criminal 
side, the Supreme Court in Oliphant and Duro originally denied tribal jurisdiction 
over all nonmembers.233 But in 1991, Congress restored tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over nonmember Indians, and in 2013 Congress restored tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over certain non-Indians accused of domestic or dating violence.234 On the civil side, 
the Supreme Court itself still recognizes tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers in 
limited circumstances—specifically, for activities on tribal lands,235 for activities 
pursuant to a consensual relationship with the tribe or its members, and for activities 
that directly affect or threaten the political integrity, economic security, or health and 
welfare of the tribe.236 That said, the trajectory of the Supreme Court’s cases on the 
civil side has been to narrow these exceptions, suggesting that, eventually, the Court 
will restrict tribal civil jurisdiction to members (and, possibly, to nonmembers who 
affirmatively consent to tribal jurisdiction).  
The second principle is that a tribe has full sovereign authority with respect to 
anyone who is a member of the tribe. The justification for this principle, again in the 
view of the Court, is that tribal members participate in tribal political processes, that 
they consent to be subject to the decisions and the actions of tribal government, and 
that this consent includes the surrender of fundamental rights as trumps against tribal-
governmental actions. Here, federal Indian law corresponds reasonably well to the 
principle. On both the criminal and the civil side, a tribe has extensive jurisdiction 
and authority over its members. Subject only to supervening federal power over the 
tribe, including possible limitations on the reach of the tribe’s personal jurisdiction 
under the due-process requirement of the Indian Civil Rights Act,237 the reach of 
tribal-governmental power over tribal members is generally as broad as the reach of 
any state government over its citizens and residents.238  
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My explanation of the implicit-divestiture cases as a resolution of the tribal-
sovereignty trilemma implies several corollary points that existing scholarship 
generally has missed or misinterpreted. First, despite claims to the contrary by 
academic writers,239 the Supreme Court remains committed to the idea of retained, 
inherent tribal sovereignty. Admittedly, the Court’s contemporary, membership-
based definition is not the same as the traditional, territorial-based definition 
advanced by the Marshall Court in Worcester; and, admittedly, the Court’s 
contemporary definition is not the same as the definition articulated by Felix Cohen, 
the father of federal Indian law. The Court’s contemporary definition is markedly 
narrower, and it understandably troubles advocates of tribal interests deeply. But it 
is simply not correct to argue that the implicit-divestiture cases represent the 
abandonment240 or the abrogation241 of tribal sovereignty. Instead, within the limits 
of the contemporary, membership-based definition, the Court’s commitment to tribal 
sovereignty remains robust. 
This commitment is evident in cases that the Court decided soon after Oliphant. 
The Court issued the Oliphant decision—and first announced the implicit-divestiture 
theory—on March 6, 1978. Just sixteen days later, the Court decided United States 
v. Wheeler, rejecting the double-jeopardy claim of a Navajo who was convicted for 
the same offense in both federal court and Navajo tribal court.242 Justice Stewart’s 
unanimous opinion in Wheeler held that tribal governments and the federal 
government constitute separate sovereigns for double-jeopardy purposes,243 and it 
emphasized that the criminal prosecution of tribal members by tribal governments is 
part of the tribes’ retained, inherent sovereignty:  
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited 
character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to 
complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their 
existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those 
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by 
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.244  
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And just two months after Wheeler, the Supreme Court decided Martinez by a 7-1 
vote.245 Martinez held that tribal governments may not be sued under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 because tribal governments have “the common-law immunity 
from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”246 Subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions have generally expanded the scope of tribal-sovereign immunity.247  
Second, the Supreme Court’s contemporary, membership-based definition of 
tribal sovereignty does not reduce tribes to the status of private, voluntary 
organizations. Arguments to the contrary by several academic writers are not 
accurate. Certainly, critics of the implicit-divestiture theory are correct that the 
membership-based definition creates a superficial resemblance between tribes and 
private, voluntary organizations. Under those cases, the authority of a tribal 
government generally extends no further than the members of that tribe—just as the 
authority of a private, voluntary organization, such as the Elks Lodge or the 
Daughters of the American Revolution, generally extends no further than the 
members of that organization. But the nature of that authority is very different in the 
case of a tribal government.248 Unlike the Elks Lodge or the Daughters of the 
American Revolution, a tribal government has the power to convict its members of 
criminal offenses and to incarcerate them. A tribal government has the power to 
marry and to divorce its members, the power to make decisions about the custody of 
its members’ children, the power to determine the ownership of its members’ 
property by testate and intestate succession, and the power to compel its members to 
pay damages or to comply with injunctive or other equitable relief in civil actions.249 
Private, voluntary organizations have no such authority, nor should they.250 
Third, the implicit-divestiture theory does not treat the relationship between tribal 
governments and nonmembers as “constitutional” or even “quasi-constitutional.” 
Philip Frickey, one of the great scholars of Indian law, uncharacteristically misreads 
the implicit-divestiture cases on this point. Frickey argues that “what the Court has 
done [in those cases]—without any conscious reflection in its opinions—is to use 
federal common law to ‘quasi-constitutionalize’ the relationship between tribes and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 245. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 246. Id. at 58. 
 247. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014); Kiowa Tribe 
of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
 248. Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1075–76 
(2004); see also Felix S. Cohen, Indian Rights and the Federal Courts, 24 MINN. L. REV. 145, 
147 (1940); Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, supra note 
196, at 479; Getches, supra note 216, at 1588; Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over 
Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 196–97 (1984). But see 
Philip P. Frickey, The Status and Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the United States, 59 
HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 383, 385–86 (1999). 
 249. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 1, at 216–20.  
 250. Robert Laurence’s assertion that “[a]n entity that has jurisdiction only over its own 
lands and its own members is more accurately denominated a ‘club’ than a ‘government’” is 
therefore not correct. Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by 
Judicial, as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in 
Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393, 394 (1995). But see T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, 
SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 
116 (2002); Dussias, supra note 27, at 93–94. 
126 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:87 
 
nonmembers.”251 He suggests that the implicit-divestiture cases work as an Indian-
law analogue to the dormant Commerce Clause,252 and he argues that this quasi-
constitutionalization “explains why the Court can pick and choose between members 
and nonmembers with respect to immunity from tribal regulation, rather than impose 
uniform limitations upon tribal action benefiting members and nonmembers 
alike.”253 But this gets the matter backwards. The Court has not distinguished 
between members and nonmembers in order to force constitutional (or even “quasi-
constitutional”) limitations on the relationship between tribal governments and 
nonmembers. Instead, the Court has distinguished between members and 
nonmembers in order to impose a firm jurisdictional separation between tribal 
governments and nonmembers—precisely because the relationship between tribal 
governments and nonmembers is not subject to constitutional limitations. 
Again, it bears emphasis that my purpose thus far has been neither to defend nor 
to challenge the Supreme Court’s redefinition of tribal sovereignty. Instead, my 
purpose has been to explain what the Court is doing in the implicit-divestiture cases 
and to show why, in the Court’s view, the shift from the traditional, territorial-based 
definition to the contemporary, membership-based definition is a proper resolution 
of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. Whether the Court’s position is normatively right 
is a legitimate question, and I will turn to that, in a limited way, in the final part of 
this paper. But one cannot evaluate the Court’s decisions without first understanding 
what the Court is doing and why the Court is doing it. For the most part, the academic 
writing on the implicit-divestiture cases has jumped straight to the normative 
question without first laying an appropriate foundation.  
II. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS 
Legal scholars working in federal Indian law have offered various explanations 
of the implicit-divestiture cases. Among these have been occasional suggestions that 
the cases address a tension between tribal sovereignty and fundamental rights, but 
these suggestions remain largely undeveloped and skeptical. In particular, they do 
not capture the stubborn incompatibility of the three objectives underlying the tribal-
sovereignty trilemma—the preservation of traditional, territorial-based tribal 
sovereignty; the preservation of the tribal governments’ placement outside the 
federalist structure; and the preservation of fundamental rights. They perceive that 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers may present a conflict between tribal interests 
and the interests of nonmembers, and they criticize the Supreme Court for preferring 
the latter over the former. But they generally fail to see that the Court must 
compromise one of the underlying objectives, and they generally fail to evaluate the 
merits of the other available options. 
Frickey, for example, in an article that otherwise finds incoherence in the Supreme 
Court’s Indian-law decisions, describes Oliphant as recognizing both “a concern for 
the practical realities of political community” and a “civil rights concern,” and he 
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argues that “[t]he dual notion of political community and civil rights is the strongest 
rationale for the Court’s decision.”254 In a separate article, Frickey suggests that the 
implicit-divestiture cases “flatten[] federal Indian law into the broader American 
public law by importing general constitutional and subconstitutional values into the 
field.”255 L. Scott Gould argues that the “root cause of the Court’s unwillingness to 
vest tribes with regulatory or adjudicatory jurisdiction over non-Indians and 
nonmembers is its inability to reconcile the constitutional protection of individual 
rights with the tribal conception of group rights.”256 He says that “[t]here is virtually 
no textual basis in the Constitution” for tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers but that 
“the rights of individuals to due process and equal protection are hallmarks of the 
Constitution and the Court’s modern jurisprudence.”257 
Robert A. Williams, Jr., analyzing Hicks, argues that the Supreme Court should 
have considered legitimate questions about due process for nonmember civil 
defendants in tribal courts,258 and David E. Wilkins, analyzing Oliphant, says that 
the majority opinion “was, in effect, elevating the rights of non-Indian American 
citizens above those of the extraconstitutional sovereign tribal governments which 
are governed and populated by individuals who are also American citizens.”259 
Joseph William Singer argues that the “Court appears to view tribal governments as 
racially exclusive and undemocratic, and thus, inherently suspect, particularly 
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because existing laws do not allow federal court review of tribal court judgments.”260 
David H. Getches suggests that, across its Indian-law docket, the Court “may, in fact, 
be more concerned with correcting the perceived injustices of applying Indian law 
principles to the rights or conduct of non-Indians,” although he finds that explanation 
to be inadequate for “fully half [the Rehnquist Court’s] Indian law cases, where 
justice for non-Indian interests is not a significant factor.”261 And in an essay about 
the implicit-divestiture cases, Bethany Berger argues that “[t]he liberal objection to 
tribal interests is even stronger when the vindication of those interests appears to 
conflict with individual rights.”262 
But much of the scholarship on the implicit-divestiture cases favors other 
explanations. Most prominent have been arguments that the contemporary Supreme 
Court has abandoned the foundational principles of federal Indian law, that the Court 
is indifferent and even hostile to the rights of racial minorities in general and of 
Indians in particular, and that the Court is simply not able to produce a coherent body 
of federal Indian law. These competing explanations are not mutually inconsistent, 
and they generally treat the implicit-divestiture theory as an indefensible intrusion 
on retained, inherent tribal sovereignty. In my view, the explanation put forth in Part 
I offers a better account of the cases. But even if I cannot agree that the competing 
explanations are entirely right, I cannot argue that they are entirely wrong either. 
A. Abandonment of Foundational Principles 
One explanation holds that, beginning sometime during the 1970s, the Supreme 
Court lost its way in federal Indian law. Following the work of Felix Cohen in his 
definitive 1941 treatise,263 this explanation looks to the three decisions known as the 
“Marshall trilogy”—Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester—as establishing the 
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foundational principles of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty.264 Before contact 
with non-Indians, Cohen had reasoned, Indian tribes held all the attributes of 
sovereignty; he argued that contact, colonialism, and the expansion of the United 
States restricted tribal sovereignty but did not eliminate it.265 Cohen maintained that, 
under the Marshall trilogy, tribes retain all attributes of sovereignty except those 
surrendered by treaty or other agreement with the United States and those taken away 
by act of Congress.266 
This explanation argues that the implicit-divestiture theory is inconsistent with 
the foundational principles established by the Marshall trilogy. Under Chief Justices 
Stone, Vinson, and Warren, the Supreme Court generally followed those principles 
closely. The unanimous 1959 decision in Williams, requiring that a civil suit brought 
by a non-Indian against an Indian concerning a transaction on tribal land be brought 
in tribal court, represents perhaps the highpoint of the Court’s fidelity to those 
principles. But during the 1970s, this account maintains, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions increasingly drifted away from the foundational principles, to the detriment 
of tribal sovereignty. Although a few members of the Court (such as Justices 
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun) still generally followed the foundational 
principles, the Court as a whole supposedly lost interest in federal Indian law, did 
not really understand federal Indian law, and did not fully subscribe to the idea that 
Indian tribes are sovereign.  
Instead, this explanation argues, the contemporary Court decides Indian-law cases 
on normative grounds, setting the law to match the Court’s idea of what the status of 
tribal governments should be. The result has been the implicit-divestiture theory and 
the erosion of the traditional, territorial-based sovereignty championed by Chief 
Justice Marshall and Cohen. This explanation argues, no doubt correctly, that the 
implicit-divestiture cases cannot be reconciled with the doctrinal implications of the 
foundational principles. And so, treating the implicit-divestiture cases as an 
erroneous line of decisions, it generally advocates a return to the foundational 
principles and the restoration of full tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers and non-Indians within Indian country.  
Getches, a leading proponent of this account, argues that the Supreme Court has 
“abandon[ed] entrenched principles of Indian law in favor of an approach that bends 
tribal sovereignty to fit the Court’s perceptions of non-Indian interests.”267 In his 
view, “Indian rights are losing the limited protection they had as the Court forsakes 
foundation principles and expands the ambit of control over Indian tribes to include 
not just congressional but also judicial power to redefine and restrict tribal 
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sovereignty.”268 Oliphant represents a “sharp departure from foundation principles” 
of federal Indian law,269 and Montana “announce[s] remarkable departures from 
established Indian law principles.”270 In large measure, Getches argues, the Court’s 
implicit-divestiture decisions aim to mitigate “cultural conflict” between Indians and 
non-Indians.271 In his view, the Court generally has replaced its adherence to the 
foundational principles with “subjective, case-by-case determinations of whether a 
tribe retain[s] its inherent sovereignty in particular circumstances.”272 Thus, “the 
Court has assumed the prerogative of balancing various non-Indian interests in order 
to prune tribal sovereignty to the Court’s own notion of what it ought to look like.”273 
The central claim of this explanation is obviously accurate. The implicit-
divestiture cases certainly deviate from the foundational principles established by the 
Marshall trilogy. But the explanation is incomplete; it requires more. The explanation 
describes what the Court has done in doctrinal terms, but it provides no account of 
why the Court has done it. It is not plausible to suppose that the contemporary 
Supreme Court is just too lazy or too badly informed to grasp the foundational 
principles of federal Indian law. Admittedly, Oliphant was a decision of notoriously 
poor quality. Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, whether deliberately or not, 
misconstrues the historical record on tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
and its interpretation of the Marshall trilogy is perplexing.274 But any suggestion that 
the implicit-divestiture cases might be corrected by the Court’s close reading of a 
few law review articles explaining the foundational principles seems badly 
misguided. 
The Court must have reasons for straying from the foundational principles. 
Getches suggests that the point of the decisions is to mitigate “cultural conflict” 
between Indians and non-Indians; others might impute darker motivations to the 
Court, such as indifference or hostility to the claims of racial minorities.275 From the 
Court’s perspective, what made sense in the first half of the nineteenth century (when 
Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and Worcester were decided) or even in the middle of 
the twentieth century (when Cohen first restated federal Indian law) does not 
necessarily make sense at the end of the twentieth century or the start of the twenty-
first century. 
There has been an awful lot of water over the dam since the Marshall trilogy. 
Allotment has rendered much of Indian country a demographic admixture of Indians 
and non-Indians, tribal members and nonmembers.276 The tribes, against all odds, 
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have risen up in the last half century, asserting themselves politically and 
economically in a manner not seen for decades (or, depending on the tribe, for 
centuries).277 The greater physical proximity of Indians and non-Indians and the 
greater political and economic reach of the tribes has substantially increased the 
number and the extent of interactions between tribal governments and nonmembers 
without the intermediation of the federal government.278 Understandably, legal 
scholars who advocate tribal interests do not necessarily agree that these 
developments justify the abandonment of the traditional, territorial-based definition 
of tribal sovereignty. But surely it is legitimate for the Supreme Court, which, after 
all, has been the prime mover of the rights revolution, to revisit its nineteenth-century 
precedents on tribal sovereignty in light of these demographic, political, economic, 
and legal changes. 
In the end, it must be more plausible that the Supreme Court, in producing the 
implicit-divestiture cases, has been actively reinterpreting and adjusting its 
precedents rather than simply not understanding them or ignoring them without 
reason. It is a fair criticism that the implicit-divestiture cases deviate from the 
foundational principles of the Marshall trilogy. But the deviation has been intentional 
rather than accidental and active rather than passive. The better explanation is that 
the Court, whether consciously or not, has redefined tribal sovereignty in order to 
resolve the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. 
B. Indifference or Hostility to Racial Minorities 
A second explanation of the implicit-divestiture cases maintains that the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have been indifferent and even hostile to the rights of 
racial minorities. On this account, shifting from the traditional, territorial-based 
definition of tribal sovereignty to the contemporary, membership-based definition 
fits within a larger pattern. Although the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have 
continued the rights revolution, they have changed its focus.279 Where the Warren 
Court aggressively protected the rights of racial minorities, today’s Court instead 
aggressively protects other rights, such as those involving religious liberties, political 
speech, and firearms.280 On this account, tribal sovereignty has been a casualty of 
different judicial priorities in the years since Chief Justice Warren’s retirement. 
Scholars present this explanation in two versions—one moderate and the other 
more pointed. The moderate version argues that the Supreme Court has lost interest 
in the rights of racial minorities over the past half century; in this version, the cases 
cutting back on tribal sovereignty are incidental to the Court’s general apathy about 
racial inequality. Charles Wilkinson suggests that decisions such as Oliphant, 
Montana, Atkinson Trading Co., and Hicks may be a function, in part, of particular 
members of the Court “look[ing] skeptically on assertions of minority rights.”281 
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Similarly, Getches thinks that the Indian-law decisions of the Rehnquist Court can 
be explained in part by the Court’s tendency “to disfavor claims of racial 
minorities.”282 And N. Bruce Duthu argues that the implicit-divestiture doctrine “is 
overly burdened with historical and ethnocentric biases.”283  
Frank Pommersheim thinks that the contemporary Supreme Court has become 
“increasingly inimical to tribal sovereignty.”284 He reads the implicit-divestiture 
cases and other Indian-law decisions as establishing a “new paradigm.”285 Tribal 
governments generally prevail in the Supreme Court, he argues, when they claim 
tribal sovereignty “defensively”—that is, to resist the encroachment of state-court 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands.286 But tribal governments generally lose 
in the Supreme Court when they claim their sovereignty “offensively”—that is, to 
assert jurisdiction over non-Indians.287 Pommersheim maintains that the Court’s 
approach in the second group of cases “makes no reference to constitutional, 
statutory, or treaty analysis, but instead appears to rest on mere judicial preference; 
a preference that often seems to border on fear of, or even hostility to, tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.”288 Similarly, Berger attributes the contemporary 
Supreme Court’s Indian-law decisions, including the implicit-divestiture cases, to 
“an inability to see tribal interests as sovereign interests or to understand what tribal 
sovereignty means to Native people and others.”289  
The more pointed version argues that the Supreme Court is actively hostile to the 
claims of racial minorities in general and to those of Indians in particular. Ann 
Tweedy attributes the implicit-divestiture cases to “the Supreme Court’s increasing 
preoccupation with liberal goals in the decades following the Civil Rights 
Movement.”290 Tweedy sees in the Court’s “liberalism” an “assimilationist agenda” 
and “the racist idea that whiteness connotes neutrality whereas Indianness or color 
connotes bias or special interest.”291 And the Court’s redefinition of tribal 
sovereignty, she argues, is grounded specifically in social-contract theory—which, 
she says, is “a peculiarly Western doctrine that should not be forced upon non-
Western peoples” and which “is premised upon the notion of a homogeneous culture” 
to the detriment of “minority cultures.”292 Similarly, Robert N. Clinton argues that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 282. Getches, supra note 261, at 317. 
 283. Duthu, supra note 262, at 355.  
 284. Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate Paradigm of Tribal 
Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. REV. 48, 50 (2010). 
 285. Id. at 48–49. 
 286. Id. at 54. 
 287. Id. at 54–55. 
 288. Id. at 56. 
 289. Bethany R. Berger, Hope for Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, 
Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant, Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1901, 1911 
(2017). 
 290. Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment and 
Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147, 147 (1999–2000). 
 291. Id. at 147–48. 
 292. Id. at 199; see also id. at 208–210. 
2020] REDEFINING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY  133 
 
the implicit-divestiture cases derive from a subtle form of “racism/colonialism.”293 
Clinton finds that:  
[The Supreme Court’s] preference for political resolution of minority 
rights questions is unidirectional—it operates only to protect the right of 
non-Indian political processes to control the rights, destinies, and 
interests of Indian minorities, but not the right of Indian governments to 
affect the rights and interests of non-Indians or non-member Indians who 
reside within their reservation and affect the lives of tribal members.294 
Williams also offers a harsh condemnation. Surveying the Court’s Indian-law 
cases through the end of the Rehnquist Court, he argues that “the language of racism 
directed at Indians that was so popular with the justices in the nineteenth century is 
still being perpetuated by the Supreme Court in many of its most important decisions 
on Indian rights in the post-Brown era.”295 Williams says that the contemporary 
Court’s general abandonment of “racist precedents” and “hostile stereotypes” with 
respect to African Americans and “the supposed benevolent racial paradigm shift 
represented by . . . Brown” never extended to the Court’s treatment of Indians.296 
More specifically, he argues that “a long legacy of hostile, romanticized, and 
incongruously imagined stereotypes of Indians as incommensurable savages”—
which he traces to the foundational decisions of the Marshall trilogy—continues to 
shape the way the justices view and understand the legal history, and therefore the 
legal rights, of Indian tribes.”297 Pointing in particular to Oliphant, Williams says 
that “[t]he justices continue to uphold a form of legalized racial dictatorship.”298 He 
reads Oliphant as reasoning that Indian tribes are “far too uncivilized to be allowed 
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.”299 And, he says, the Court’s 
racism persists through decisions such as Hicks and Lara. In his view, those cases 
“show how a long-established language of racism continues to be employed to 
support a jurispathic, rights-destroying principle of racial discrimination applied to 
Indians in America.”300 
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This explanation, at least in its moderate version, is consistent with the 
contemporary Court’s stated project of pursuing a color-blind reading of the 
Constitution and generally eliminating race-based distinctions from federal, state, 
and local law.301 Such skepticism about differential treatment of racial minorities 
almost inevitably takes particular exception to federal Indian law. Not only do 
Indians enjoy certain advantages within the legal system—such as the employment 
preferences approved by the Court in Morton v. Mancari302 and the adoption-
placement preferences questioned by the Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl303—
but Indian tribes, as sovereigns, stand outside the federalist structure. This 
explanation thus reads the implicit-divestiture cases as the Court’s effort to limit and 
ultimately destroy tribal sovereignty as a racial preference; in effect, it sees the 
implicit-divestiture cases as reaching for the final political, legal, and cultural 
assimilation of Indians into American society.304 
But there are problems with this explanation. First, it cannot explain why the 
members of the Court who have voted against the tribal governments in the implicit-
divestiture cases often include those who generally are among the most solicitous of 
minority rights.305 Justice White and Justice Blackmun voted with the majority in 
Oliphant; Justice White voted with the majority in Montana; Justices White and 
Blackmun voted with the majority in Duro; Strate was a unanimous opinion, with 
Justice Ginsburg writing for the Court; Justice Ginsburg joined the majority opinion 
in Nevada v. Hicks; and Atkinson Trading also was a unanimous opinion.306 Why 
would the usual defenders of racial minorities’ civil rights join the implicit-
divestiture decisions if the point of those decisions were to undermine the rights of 
Indians? It seems highly implausible Justices White, Blackmun, Ginsburg, and others 
have a particular anti-Indian animus. 
Second, it does not explain why the Supreme Court has chosen to redefine 
retained, inherent tribal sovereignty in membership terms but, within that 
redefinition, to preserve, and in some respects to strengthen, tribal sovereignty. In 
Wheeler, the Supreme Court relied on tribal sovereignty to reject the double-jeopardy 
challenge of an Indian tried in both tribal and federal court; in Martinez, the Court 
relied on tribal sovereignty to hold that tribal governments may not be sued for 
violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968; and in other cases since Oliphant, 
the Court generally has expanded the scope of tribal sovereign immunity.307 If the 
Court is truly hostile to tribal sovereignty as an impermissible race-based preference, 
why has it only redefined—but not abolished—tribal sovereignty? 
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C. Incoherence of Indian-Law Decisions 
A third explanation argues that the contemporary Supreme Court’s Indian-law 
decisions, including its implicit-divestiture cases, are simply incoherent. This 
explanation argues that the Court’s decisions over the past several decades resemble 
a random walk—they are inconsistent with each other, and they collectively fail to 
produce a cogent body of law. On this account, the Court has no principled 
framework—no “organizing method”308—to discipline its analysis. In Frickey’s 
words, the Indian-law cases are “largely a collection of ad hoc judicial 
assessments,”309 and the implicit-divestiture decisions in particular form “a motley 
lot”310 and “lack any sort of coherent core.”311 
Frickey considers and rejects the possibility that the Court’s Indian-law cases, 
including the implicit-divestiture decisions, reflect congressional intent.312 Instead, 
he argues that the cases generally are driven by one or more of four values: 
“enforcing a tradition of protecting Indian rights, avoiding congressional 
expectations that are obsolescent in the current Indian context, applying manageable 
judicial standards, and defining civil rights by measuring the appropriate scope of 
sovereignty within a political community.”313 But Frickey maintains that those values 
often conflict, and he finds it “impossible” to arrange them in a way that provides a 
consistent description of the Court’s holdings.314 “Although one or more of the 
factors” may explain the outcome in an individual case, he says, “collectively the 
factors are so deeply divisive that they seemingly add up to nothing.”315 In his view, 
“foundational theory” and “elemental concepts”—such as the notion that a “tribe is 
fully sovereign except to the extent a federal statute, agreement, or treaty says 
otherwise”—are “unlikely candidate[s] for resolving particular disputes in federal 
Indian law.”316 There is, in Frickey’s view, a stubborn “incoherence” in the Supreme 
Court’s Indian case law.317 
Consider how the implicit-divestiture cases, taken as a whole, resist the effort to 
find underlying cogency. Oliphant, which introduced the implicit-divestiture theory 
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to hold that Indian tribes may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
definitely departs from the foundational principles of the Marshall trilogy.318 That 
makes Oliphant an innovation, but it does not necessarily make it nonsensical. And 
Duro, which holds that Indian tribes may not exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians, is generally consistent with the reasoning of Oliphant.319 But 
Lara, which holds both that Duro was correctly decided and that the federal statute 
overturning Duro did not constitute a congressional delegation of criminal 
jurisdiction to the tribes, contradicts itself. Following Oliphant, Duro specifically 
said that the tribal-governmental powers “lost” through implicit divestiture320 are 
those “necessarily surrendered by the tribes in their submission to the overriding 
sovereignty of the United States.”321 Any exercise of criminal jurisdiction over 
“outsiders,” the Duro Court said, would require a delegation of power from 
Congress.322 The Court in Lara, however, effectively ignores that part of Duro, 
insisting that the legislation overturning Duro “recognized and affirmed”323 the 
tribes’ inherent criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians without any 
congressional delegation of federal power.324 Whether by accident or design, this 
misstates Duro, which plainly indicated that tribal-governmental powers lost through 
implicit divestiture could be restored only by such a delegation.325 Put simply, Lara 
is trying to have it both ways.326 
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Matters are still messier on the civil side. Montana, holding that tribes generally 
lack civil-regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember Indians, is not radically 
inconsistent with Oliphant and Duro, but it draws distinctions not drawn by those 
cases.327 Montana says that tribes have civil-regulatory jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians with respect to activities on tribal lands—a point with no analog under 
Oliphant and Duro.328 Additionally, Montana sets out the two Montana exceptions 
under which tribes have civil-regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers on non-tribal 
lands—again, a point foreign to Oliphant and Duro.329 Strate, which extends the 
Montana framework to civil-adjudicative jurisdiction, is consistent with Montana, 
but Hicks is inconsistent with both Montana and Strate.330 In Hicks, the Court 
indicated that the status of land as tribal or non-tribal is just “one factor” to consider 
for purposes of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.331 The lack of cogency on 
the civil side is perhaps best illustrated by Brendale, in which the nine members of 
the Court were unable to articulate a framework for deciding whether an Indian tribe 
had the authority to apply its zoning ordinance to non-tribal reservation lands.332 
The problem, on this explanation of the implicit-divestiture cases, is not just that 
the Supreme Court has strayed from the foundational principles of federal Indian law 
in general and of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty in particular. Rather, the 
problem is that the Court, as a collective, simply does not have a clear idea of what 
it is doing or where it is headed. After first announcing the implicit-divestiture theory 
in Oliphant, the Court has been unsure how far the theory reaches. Does the implicit-
divestiture theory limit tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians? Duro, Montana, 
and Strate indicate that it does; Lara, which validated the legislation overturning 
Duro, suggests that it does not. Does the implicit-divestiture theory limit tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers (on the civil side) and non-Indians (on the criminal 
side) throughout Indian country? Oliphant and Hicks suggest that little or no 
distinction should be drawn between tribal and non-tribal lands within a reservation; 
Montana strongly indicates otherwise. The Court does appear to be making it all up 
as it goes along.  
And yet, that is how adjudicative lawmaking generally works; certainly, that is 
the approach followed by the common-law courts for centuries. Each new decision 
may move the law and, in so doing, may introduce inconsistencies and incongruities 
that require remediation by future decisions or by supervening legislation. In 
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characterizing the common law, Holmes observed that it “is always approaching, and 
never reaching, consistency” and that “[i]t will become entirely consistent only when 
it ceases to grow.”333 As shown in Part I, the implicit-divestiture cases do point, 
however imperfectly, in a particular direction. There is a cogent story to tell about 
them: they are the Court’s attempt to resolve the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. Even 
if loose ends remain, that explanation fits the implicit-divestiture cases better than 
does Frickey’s frustrated conclusion that the cases make no sense.334 
III. RECONSIDERING THE TRIBAL-SOVEREIGNTY TRILEMMA 
In Part I, I argued that the implicit-divestiture cases—the judicial change from the 
traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty to the contemporary, 
membership-based definition—should be understood as the Supreme Court’s honest, 
good-faith resolution of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma. I presented this account as 
a positive explanation, not as a normative assessment. Although I neither defended 
nor attacked the implicit-divestiture decisions, I argued that they do not represent the 
Court’s wholesale rejection or abandonment of tribal sovereignty, as some scholars 
have maintained. In Part II, I argued that the explanation set forth in Part I is a more 
accurate account than prominent explanations found in the scholarly literature.  
In this Part III, I shift my approach from the descriptive and the analytical to the 
evaluative. Specifically, I compare the Court’s resolution of the tribal-sovereignty 
trilemma to the other possible resolutions that might be implemented through federal 
common law, federal legislation, or constitutional amendment. Throughout, it is 
important to bear in mind that the denial of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers is 
deeply problematic. It is a serious affront to the dignity of tribal governments as 
sovereigns. By imposing jurisdictional limitations on tribal governments that do not 
apply to other governments, the Supreme Court has taken upon itself the authority to 
diminish the tribes’ sovereign status.335 Additionally, the denial of jurisdiction over 
nonmembers undermines the capacity of tribal governments to protect the health, 
safety, welfare, and morals of persons—members and nonmembers alike—living 
within Indian country.336 Even if the Court considers its approach the most attractive 
(or the least unattractive) resolution of the trilemma, one cannot ignore that the 
implicit-divestiture cases cut very hard and very deep against tribal interests. 
What, then, are the other options for resolving the trilemma? Congress or the 
Supreme Court could reverse course on the implicit-divestiture cases and recognize 
general tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons and activities within 
Indian country. That would both reinstate the traditional, territorial-based definition 
of tribal sovereignty and preserve the placement of tribal governments outside the 
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federalist structure, but it would undermine fundamental rights.337 The trilemma 
instead could be resolved by treating tribal governments like state governments for 
purposes of the constitutional-rights provisions. That would both reinstate the 
traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty and preserve fundamental 
rights, but it also would force tribal governments into the federalist structure.338 And 
of course, the Court could continue along its current path until it holds, in the end, 
that tribal governments have no criminal or civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, 
subject to whatever ad hoc exceptions Congress may enact.339  
A. Restoring Territorial-Based Tribal Sovereignty 
To date, the Supreme Court has resolved the tribal-sovereignty trilemma by 
compromising the traditional definition of tribal sovereignty. But the trilemma could 
be resolved instead by compromising fundamental rights. That is, the law could 
return to the traditional, territorial-based definition of retained, inherent tribal 
sovereignty and continue the placement of tribal governments outside the federalist 
structure, thereby taking the position that nonmembers may not assert fundamental 
rights as trumps against tribal-governmental action. This approach would not require 
constitutional amendment; it could be effected through ordinary adjudication or 
legislation.  
On the adjudicative side, the Supreme Court could simply reverse course on the 
implicit-divestiture cases, overruling Oliphant, Montana, Strate, Hicks, and the 
related decisions. As Justice Thomas observed in his Lara concurrence, the implicit-
divestiture theory is a creature of federal common law, not of constitutional law.340 
For the same reason, Congress could overturn the implicit-divestiture cases by 
statute. Because the cases are grounded in federal common law (and, in fact, purport 
to interpret previous legislative and executive action), there is no constitutional 
limitation on Congress recognizing tribal criminal or civil jurisdiction over 
nonmembers. Congress has already done so, although on a very limited basis. The 
Duro fix, passed in 1991, specifically overturned the result in Duro and provided that 
Indian tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.341 
Amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act partially overturned the result in 
Oliphant and provided that Indian tribes may exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians for certain domestic-violence and dating-violence offenses against 
Indians.342 
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Of the possible resolutions to the tribal-sovereignty trilemma, this one would 
represent the most robust commitment to retained, inherent tribal sovereignty. It 
would recognize that tribal governments are separate and distinct from both the 
federal government and the state governments and that tribal governments retain the 
full territorial jurisdiction normally attributed to sovereigns. In effect, this approach 
would treat a tribal government as being every much as sovereign over Indian 
country as the French government is sovereign over the lands of France (although, 
in the case of a tribal government, subject always to the greater power of the U.S. 
federal government). That would go a long way to restoring the authority and dignity 
of tribal governments lost through many years of colonialism, confinement to 
reservations, allotment, and forced assimilation. Advocates of tribal interests have 
proposed legislative and adjudicative reform of the implicit-divestiture cases along 
these lines.343 
But this approach necessarily would require that fundamental rights give way 
whenever those rights potentially conflict with tribal-governmental power.344 That 
no doubt would generate resistance across the political spectrum. After many decades 
of the rights revolution, the Supreme Court at one time or another has ruled in favor 
of rights important to just about every segment of U.S. society—rights concerning 
free speech, religious liberty, same-sex marriage, abortion, owning and carrying 
firearms, criminal procedure, equal protection for racial minorities and women, and 
due process in civil proceedings.345 Even without a showing that any particular tribal 
government would provide less protection for fundamental rights than what the 
Court’s decisions require for federal, state, and local governments, many would be 
troubled by the mere notion that tribal governments would not be constrained by the 
rights that otherwise can be asserted against government at any level. 
For that reason, the prospects for simply overturning the implicit-divestiture cases 
and returning to the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty seem 
poor. The political backlash to such an approach could well do more harm to the 
independence and the integrity of tribal governments than the implicit-divestiture 
cases themselves have done. For more than a century, the Supreme Court has 
maintained that Congress has plenary power over the Indian tribes—including the 
power to terminate the tribes entirely.346 A perception among legislators and the 
public that the only available policy choices are the surrender of fundamental rights 
within Indian country or the broad curtailment of tribal-governmental powers could 
lead to political consequences that undermine tribal interests generally. At the very 
least, those who advocate this resolution should consider the possibility of serious 
unintended consequences for the Indian tribes. 
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B. Bringing Tribal Governments into the Federalist Structure 
Another possible resolution of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma is to force tribal 
governments into the federalist structure. This approach would permit tribal 
governments to exercise full criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons and 
activities within Indian country but would also require tribal governments to respect 
fundamental rights as those rights have been interpreted by the Supreme Court.347 
Although the analogy is imperfect in several respects, tribal governments under this 
approach would be treated much like state governments. They would exercise 
traditional, territorial-based jurisdiction, but claims that their exercise of 
governmental power violate the Constitution would be subject to general review in 
the federal courts.  
This resolution could be implemented through several different mechanisms. The 
most straightforward would be a constitutional amendment recognizing tribal 
governments and specifying their place within the federalist structure.348 The 
Constitution currently makes only a single reference to Indian tribes. The Indian 
Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate “[c]ommerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”349 Although the 
Supreme Court has interpreted that clause to give Congress plenary power over 
Indian tribes (an interpretation that remains controversial), the clause provides no 
apparent basis for equating tribal governments with state governments. Additionally, 
tribal governments are not mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides 
the hook for incorporating portions of the Bill of Rights against state governments. 
A constitutional amendment, therefore, could specifically empower tribal 
governments to exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction on a territorial basis and 
require tribal governments to conform to the Fourteenth Amendment and to the 
constitutional-rights provisions that already bind the states.  
A second mechanism would be for the Supreme Court to overrule its 1896 
decision in Talton.350 Talton held that the tribes do not derive their sovereignty from 
the Constitution and therefore are not subject to the individual rights protected by the 
Constitution.351 But the reasoning in Talton is sound, and it is unclear how the 
Supreme Court could justify a different outcome now. After all, the Indian 
Commerce Clause includes the only constitutional reference to Indian tribes, and the 
tribes, unlike the states, had no role in the ratification of the Constitution or its 
amendments. What, then, would be the grounds for treating tribal governments like 
state governments without a constitutional amendment?  
 A third mechanism would be to overrule or to overturn Martinez.352 Martinez 
held that, apart from habeas corpus review of criminal convictions in tribal court, 
tribal-governmental actions cannot be reviewed in federal court for claimed 
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violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.353 The decision presented a 
statutory issue, not a constitutional issue; thus, it could be undone either by an act of 
Congress or by a ruling of the Supreme Court. If the Court overruled Martinez, the 
actions of tribal governments would be subject to federal-court review as to the 
specific fundamental rights set out in the Indian Civil Rights Act, such as the freedom 
of speech and freedom of the press, but not as to the fundamental rights omitted from 
the Indian Civil Rights Act, such as the right to bear arms. By contrast, if Congress 
overturned Martinez by statute, Congress could enlarge (or contract) the fundamental 
rights that would bind tribal governments.354 
Under each of the three mechanisms, the outcome would be generally the same. 
With the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty restored, tribal 
governments would exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons and 
activities within Indian country, and the federal courts would have jurisdiction to 
review the actions of tribal governments for claimed violations of fundamental rights. 
Such reforms have been proposed.355 But the return to full jurisdiction would come 
at a high cost to the tribes. Forcing tribal governments into the federalist structure 
and, in effect, treating them like state governments, would be a significant intrusion 
on tribal independence, autonomy, and self-determination. It would represent the 
ultimate assimilation of tribal governments into the legal system and the political 
culture of the United States. For any action implicating a fundamental right of an 
Indian or a non-Indian, tribal councils, tribal executives, and tribal courts would have 
to conduct themselves like their non-Indian counterparts. Tribal treatment of 
fundamental rights would have to be at least as protective as federal and state 
treatment of those rights, even if the result—as with the intermixing of tribal religion 
and tribal government—would be inimical to tribal culture. One might fairly ask 
whether this resolution would take more away from the tribes, in terms of legal and 
political assimilation, than it would restore to them, in terms of jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.356 
An intermediate approach could mitigate (but would not eliminate) those 
concerns. The incorporation of tribal governments into the federalist structure could 
be made elective, on a tribe-by-tribe basis. For example, Congress could amend the 
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Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to provide that any tribal government could elect to 
become subject to all the fundamental rights applicable to federal, state, and local 
governments, with federal-court review for claimed violations of those rights, in 
exchange for restoration of the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal 
sovereignty. Any nonelecting tribe would remain under the status quo. But it seems 
cynical to suggest that such a Hobson’s choice should be fully satisfactory to 
advocates of tribal interests. This approach, after all, would require a tribe to sacrifice 
a good measure of self-determination.357 
C. Conceding the Endgame of Implicit Divestiture 
Finally, the tribal-sovereignty trilemma could be resolved simply by letting the 
implicit-divestiture theory play itself out to its likely outcome. As matters stand, the 
most probable end point of the Oliphant and Montana line of cases is the loss by 
tribal governments of all criminal and civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, subject 
only to whatever ad hoc exceptions may be made by Congress. Advocates of tribal 
interests rightly find nothing attractive about this. In their view, the implicit-
divestiture cases represent a very serious, perhaps the most serious, intrusion on tribal 
sovereignty in contemporary law.358 Why, they may rightly ask, should the tribes 
simply give up the fight and accept the loss of territorial-based jurisdiction? 
From the perspective of the tribes and their advocates, conceding the endgame of 
the implicit-divestiture theory makes little sense in the abstract. But perhaps it has 
more to commend it when evaluated against the other possibilities. The first option—
restoring the traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty without 
protecting fundamental rights against tribal-governmental action—seems highly 
unlikely. When framed as a question whether tribal governments should have 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over nonmembers without the restraint of fundamental 
rights, political opposition among the non-Indian majority becomes too easy to 
marshal and too difficult to overcome. The second option—bringing tribal 
governments into the federalist structure—would be a hard bargain for tribal 
governments. It presents a very difficult trade-off: regaining jurisdiction over 
nonmembers but surrendering legal and political independence, autonomy, and self-
determination. To be brought within the federalist structure is necessarily to be 
assimilated—to become the functional equivalent of a state government (or, at best, 
an instrumentality of the federal government). Perhaps some tribes might judge the 
trade-off worth making, but others might reasonably doubt how expanded 
jurisdiction could justify the heavy price to be paid. 
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CONCLUSION 
There is no good answer here—no resolution of the tribal-sovereignty trilemma 
that can be wholly satisfactory. From the perspective of the Supreme Court, the 
implicit-divestiture cases represent a fair resolution, a proper redefinition of tribal 
sovereignty for the era of fundamental rights. In the Court’s view, the redefinition 
preserves tribal sovereignty, admittedly in a different and more limited form, without 
compromising the fundamental rights of nonmembers who by definition cannot 
participate in tribal government. From the perspective of the tribes and their 
advocates, the implicit-divestiture theory privileges the rights and interests of 
nonmembers and non-Indians over the rights and interests of tribes. It simply 
continues by other means the brutal processes of colonialism and subjugation. And 
yet the hard fact remains that tribes are unlikely to see a full restoration of the 
traditional, territorial-based definition of tribal sovereignty without being forced into 
the federalist structure.  
 
 
